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REGULATING REAL-WORLD SURVEILLANCE
Margot E. Kaminski*
Abstract: A number of laws govern information gathering, or surveillance, by private
parties in the physical world. But we lack a compelling theory of privacy harm that accounts
for the state’s interest in enacting these laws. Without a theory of privacy harm, these laws
will be enacted piecemeal. Legislators will have a difficult time justifying the laws to
constituents; the laws will not be adequately tailored to legislative interest; and courts will
find it challenging to weigh privacy harms against other strong values, such as freedom of
expression.
This Article identifies the government interest in enacting laws governing surveillance by
private parties. Using social psychologist Irwin Altman’s framework of “boundary
management” as a jumping-off point, I conceptualize privacy harm as interference in an
individual’s ability to dynamically manage disclosure and social boundaries. Stemming from
this understanding of privacy, the government has two related interests in enacting laws
prohibiting surveillance: an interest in providing notice so that an individual can adjust her
behavior; and an interest in prohibiting surveillance to prevent undesirable behavioral shifts.
Framing the government interest, or interests, this way has several advantages. First, it
descriptively maps on to existing laws: These laws either help individuals manage their
desired level of disclosure by requiring notice, or prevent individuals from resorting to
undesirable behavioral shifts by banning surveillance. Second, the framework helps us assess
the strength and legitimacy of the legislative interest in these laws. Third, it allows courts to
understand how First Amendment interests are in fact internalized in privacy laws. And
fourth, it provides guidance to legislators for the enactment of new laws governing a range of
new surveillance technologies—from automated license plate readers (ALPRs) to robots to
drones.
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INTRODUCTION
Privacy is situated; it exists in context. That context can have
physical, social, and temporal dimensions. While a growing number of
scholars have discussed the importance of context to surveillance online,
it often gets neglected in the physical world.1 Courts oversimplify

1. For explorations of context online, see, for example, HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010) (outlining
Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for
Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing online privacy as relative levels of
obscurity); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919
(2005) (discussing the social context of disclosure online); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on
the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614
(2011) (discussing cloud computing and social networking as technosocial extensions of real spaces
like the home).
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physical context, characterizing a situation as private if it takes place in
the home, and public if it takes place outside. But in practice,
surveillance subjects in the physical world rely on and use detailed
temporal, social, and physical features of their environment when
calculating their ideal degree of disclosure to others at a given moment.
When the introduction of new surveillance technologies undermines
features of the physical environment that people once relied on in
calculating their degree of privacy or openness, the state may intervene.
For example, celebrities once relied on physical distance and physical
walls to keep out snooping paparazzi. When paparazzi started using
visual and auditory enhancing technologies to overcome both distance
and walls, California enacted a paparazzi law to protect individuals from
a “constructive invasion of privacy” through the use of a “visual or
auditory enhancing device.”2 In 2014, California amended this law to
expand its coverage to constructive privacy intrusions by “any device” in
order to reach aerial surveillance by drones.3
Surveillance technologies from video cameras to drones have inspired
the enactment of a number of laws governing surveillance by private
parties in real physical space. These laws have received surprisingly
little in-depth analysis as a category.4 This Article brings these laws
together under one umbrella and proposes a way to understand the
government’s interest in enacting them.
The government has an interest in protecting privacy. But merely

2. See Act of Sept. 30, 1998, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 1000 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1708.8(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)).
3. See
Assemb.
2306, 2013–2014
Reg.
Sess.
(Cal.
2014),
available at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_2301-2350/ab_2306_bill_20140930_chaptered.pdf; DL
Cade, California Updates Invasion of Privacy Law to Ban the Use of Camera Drones, PETAPIXEL
(Oct. 14, 2014), http://petapixel.com/2014/10/14/california-passes-law-banning-drones-protectgeneral-publics-privacy/.
4. A number of these laws have been addressed as individual topics. See, e.g., Jesse Harlan
Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards in State Wiretapping
Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public Policy Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
487 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Privacy From Technological Intrusions, 1999 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 183 (2000); Michael Potere, Comment, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens
Recording Police Conduct, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 273 (2012); Travis S. Triano, Note, Who Watches
the Watchmen? Big Brother’s Use of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 CARDOZO
L. REV. 389 (2012); Nancy Danforth Zeronda, Note, Street Shootings: Covert Photography and
Public Privacy, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1131 (2010).
Several scholars have addressed image capture more holistically, but from a First Amendment
perspective. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014); Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Producing Speech, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Seth F. Kreimer,
Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (2011).
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identifying the government interest in surveillance laws as an interest in
privacy protection is inadequate because privacy can mean many
different things. The understanding of privacy behind legislation can
greatly affect the scope of that legislation, and the ability of the
government to justify it to constituents and in court.
This Article asks what theory of privacy drives the government to
protect individuals from having information about them gathered by
private, nongovernmental actors. Without a theoretical understanding of
why these laws exist, arguments over whether they should exist at all
will continue to be had on a case-by-case basis. This has led to
piecemeal legal protection.5 Legislators will find it easier to decide when
such laws are necessary if they can better identify and discuss the
government interests at stake. Understanding the government interest is
crucial for making decisions about both when to enact these laws, and
when these laws can withstand balancing against other values, such as
freedom of expression.
In the 1970s, social psychologist Irwin Altman conceived of privacy
as boundary management:6 the process of dynamically managing the
degree of disclosure of one’s self to others. Privacy is not a single state
of being; it is a process of calibration set in physical, social, and
temporal space. Altman’s great insight is that when a physical space
changes, a person’s ideal degree of disclosure does not necessarily
change with it. So if a wall functionally disappears because of a new
surveillance technology, a person who once relied on it for protection
from disclosure may now start changing her behavior, to maintain the
same desired degree of disclosure that existed when the wall protected
her.
Building on this conception of privacy, this Article proposes that the
government has a two-pronged interest in enacting surveillance laws to
govern private actors. First, it has an interest in providing notice to
individuals, both to let them recalibrate their ideal level of disclosure and
to encourage governance of surveillance through social norms. Second,
the government has an interest in preserving some situations as
surveillance-free, to prevent undesirable behavioral shifts.
Understanding the government interest this way descriptively maps

5. Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in
Public, 17 J.L. & PHIL. 559, 565 (1998) (observing that “the absence of a clearly articulated
philosophical base is not of theoretical interest only, but is at least partially responsible for the
inconsistencies, discontinuities and fragmentation, and incompleteness in the framework of legal
protections and in public and corporate policy”).
6. See generally IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1975).
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on to the laws legislators have in fact been enacting. A number of
surveillance laws provide notice to an individual so she can optimize
disclosure calibration, while other laws preserve certain situations as
surveillance-free. Understanding the government interest in surveillance
laws as an interest in boundary management should enable legislators to
thoughtfully enact new laws and enable courts to better assess the
strength of the privacy interest at stake.
The privacy interests at stake in these laws will soon be weighed
against an interest in free speech.7 Courts will soon need to assess
surveillance laws for their compatibility with freedom of expression, as
courts of appeals recognize a burgeoning First Amendment “right to
record.”8 While the outcome of this balancing is outside the scope of this
Article, a theory of the privacy interest at stake in surveillance laws can
help courts assess when the interest is strongest, and when it is weaker.
It can also help courts identify when privacy protection in fact enhances
First Amendment interests, rather than conflicts with them. This Article
shows that First Amendment interests are often internalized on the
privacy side of the equation. Protecting privacy does not always conflict
with the First Amendment; privacy protection often enables expression.
This Article begins by identifying technologies governed by
surveillance laws, ranging from cameras to cellphones to drones to
robots. It discusses several theoretical understandings of privacy, which
have been used to describe the government interest in privacy
lawmaking. It outlines Altman’s theory of privacy as boundary
management, and explains the government interests that the boundary
management framework reveals. It addresses potential criticisms of the
boundary management framework, and then identifies its benefits,
including descriptive accuracy illustrated through a number of existing
laws.
As new surveillance technologies increasingly come into public use,
legislators will look to laws of the past to govern privacy problems of
7. In a forthcoming Article, I discuss the First Amendment side of this equation. A draft version
of this forthcoming Article was workshopped at the 2015 Freedom of Expression Scholars
Conference at Yale Law School. Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record
(forthcoming 2016) (formerly titled Context, Barriers, and the Right to Record).
8. A number of courts of appeals have recently recognized a “right to record.” See Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78,
83 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Our recognition that the First Amendment protects the filming of government
officials in public spaces accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and district courts.”); Kelly
v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d
1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e agree with the Smiths that they had a First Amendment right,
subject to reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police
conduct.”).
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the very near future. Drones—with their ability to record individuals in
public, from new vantage points, and at lower cost—are one technology
driving the enactment of new privacy laws. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has proposed its rules for commercial use of
drones, and those rules are less restrictive than expected.9 In the absence
of a federal privacy regime, states will enact new laws to govern private
parties’ use of drones as a recording technology. This Article puts these
laws in historical and theoretical context, and provides guidance for the
enactment of future laws.
I.

TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES INSPIRE
LEGAL EVOLUTION

Privacy laws are driven by social and technological change. As
technologies evolve, legislators enact new laws. This Part gives an
overview of some techno-social evolutions that have inspired the
enactment of laws governing surveillance by private parties.
When Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote their seminal article
on privacy in 1890, they were spurred by the fear of ubiquitous, intrusive
recording devices: cameras.10 Cheap, portable cameras could
surreptitiously capture portraits and other private information. Warren
and Brandeis were also motivated by social change. Popular journalism
was booming, and there was a growing market for gossip.11 This
combination of social and technological change spurred Warren and
Brandeis to propose a privacy right of action.
Other technological and social change inspired other laws. Morse’s
first telegraph was sent in 184412 and Edison’s telephone was improved
9. Aaron Cooper, FAA Proposes to Allow Commercial Drone Use, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/15/politics/drones-faa-rules-commercial-flights/ (last updated Feb. 15,
2015, 3:00 PM). The President recently ordered the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration to engage in standards-setting around a voluntary privacy standard for commercial
drone use by U.S. companies. BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM: PROMOTING
ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS WHILE SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN DOMESTIC USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (2015), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/15/presidential-memorandum-promoting-economiccompetitiveness-while-safegua.
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890) (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction
that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”).
11. Id. at 196. Warren and Brandeis refer to an intrusive press “overstepping . . . bounds of
propriety and of decency.” Id.
12. LEWIS COE, THE TELEGRAPH: A HISTORY OF MORSE’S INVENTION AND ITS PREDECESSORS IN
THE UNITED STATES 32 (1993).
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in 1877.13 Wiretapping and bugging technologies were developed shortly
thereafter; the first police wiretap was in 1890.14 These technologies, and
the widespread adoption of the telephone, eventually drove the
enactment of both state and federal privacy wiretapping and
eavesdropping laws.15
A number of newer technologies enable sense-enhancement or superhuman-like powers. Infrared sensors, heat sensors, and new powerful
radar systems all allow people (mainly police) to “see” through walls.16
Facial recognition and automated license plate readers enable the largescale capture of information, tracking of individuals and their vehicles,
and correlation of that information with information housed in massive
databases.17 Widespread adoption of Global Positioning System (GPS)
technology has also driven extensive legal debate, culminating in a
recent Supreme Court case and state laws.18 Mobile carriers also track
cellphone user movements, and “stingrays” or cell site simulators allow
operators to directly access the location of cell phone users by
mimicking cell towers.19 Cell site tracking has received legislative and

13. GEORGE B. PRESCOTT, BELL’S ELECTRIC SPEAKING TELEPHONE: ITS INVENTION,
CONSTRUCTION, APPLICATION, MODIFICATION AND HISTORY iv (1884).
14. For a history of wiretapping, see generally JAMES G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE (1994); WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE
POLITICS OF WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION (1998); PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING
PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995); ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN
FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET
(2000).
15. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521 (2012)); Act of March 25, 1987, 1986 Ohio
Laws 457 (codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.51–.59 (West, Westlaw through
2015)).
16. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (holding that police use of thermal imaging to
“see” into a house was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v.
Denson, 775 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that “the government brought with it a
Doppler radar device capable of detecting from outside the home the presence of ‘human breathing
and movement within’”); Brad Heath, New Police Radars Can “See” Inside Homes, USA TODAY
(Jan. 20, 2015, 1:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/01/19/police-radar-seethroughwalls/22007615/.
17. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss:
Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 410 (2012) (explaining that
uses of facial recognition technologies “range from confirming targets for elimination and pairing
photographs and data from different databases, to monitoring individuals as they move through
public space”).
18. United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); H.R. 0603, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mont. 2013).
19. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/maps/stingraytracking-devices-whos-got-them (last visited Sept. 5, 2015).
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judicial attention.20
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or drones, have shrunk in size,
and lowered in cost in the past few years.21 The increase in small drone
use by hobbyists, and anticipated increase in drone use by commercial
entities, has inspired states to enact a number of laws governing
information capture by drones.22 Drones are cheaper than helicopters,
easier to operate, and provide a different vantage point than cellphone
cameras. They also can capture information continuously, rather than at
the behest of a user.
The much-anticipated rise of the Internet of Things—that is, a range
of interconnected devices with sensors in the home, such as smart
refrigerators—may inspire a range of new privacy laws. The Internet of
Things will place eyes in the home, and create far more pervasive
surveillance than exists even with today’s extensive cellphone usage.
Household robots may eventually raise similar privacy challenges,
giving third party companies a window into locations to which they
never had access.23 As discussed at greater length in Part V.D., robots
may also create new challenges due to anthropomorphic
characteristics.24 People may end up trusting their robots, caring for
them, and consequently revealing more information than they would to a
threatening-looking camera.
II.

THEORIES OF PRIVACY AND INFORMATION GATHERING

In reaction to new technologies, states have enacted a range of laws
governing surveillance in the physical environment.25 Some of these
20. See, e.g., Annabelle Steinhacker & Rubin Sinins, New Jersey High Court Correctly Rules
Cell Phone Locations Are Constitutionally Protected, JURIST (Oct. 21, 2013, 10:17 PM),
http://jurist.org/sidebar/2013/10/steinhacker-sinins-NJ-cell-tracking.php.
21. See Hearing on Using Unmanned Aerial Systems Within the Homeland: Security Game
Changer?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, & Mgmt. of the H. Comm.
on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony and statement of Amie Stepanovich, Association
Litigation
Counsel,
Electronic
Privacy
Information
Center),
available
at
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Stepanovich.pdf.
22. M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29 (2011),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/drone-privacy-catalyst.
23. See generally Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What Will We Have Agreed To?, 51
IDAHO L. REV. 661 (2015).
24. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015);
Kate Darling, Extending Legal Rights to Social Robots (April 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2044797 (arguing that because
people tend to anthropomorphize robots, we should consider granting some kinds of legal
protections to robots).
25. See infra Part V.A.
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laws criminalize surveillance, while others provide a private right of
action. These laws can be characterized as restrictions or prohibitions on
surveillance; they govern the act by which information is collected.26 But
the government does not have a uniform interest in preventing all private
information gathering, and diverse government interests are reflected in
the diversity of the laws. The laws are tailored to particular technologies,
such as zoom lenses, or to protect against particular harms, such as
listening in on and recording a conversation. This suggests that
legislatures understand that there is a range of government interests in
preventing private actor surveillance.
Historically, a number of surveillance laws have been aimed at
intrusive behavior by the media or others. These laws have been subject
to little theoretical analysis for two reasons. First, the quintessential
prohibition on private-actor surveillance is one of the oldest, bestestablished, and least-challenged privacy laws: the privacy tort of
intrusion upon seclusion.27 Second, most recent theorizing around
privacy has addressed the puzzles raised by big data, focusing on what
restrictions to place on data processing, not the moment at which data
are gathered.28 But many data analytics companies are now pursuing
business models that rely on actively gathering information in the
physical world rather than using information provided by others or
gathered online.29 This brings legislators back to the older question of
how to govern surveillance, or information gathering, that takes place in
the physical world.
The earliest such laws—the eavesdropping nuisance, Peeping Tom
laws, and the tort of intrusion upon seclusion—could be justified as
protecting a very modest understanding of privacy: privacy as physical
withdrawal from the world. These early laws at their essence protect
agreed-upon private spaces. While intrusion upon seclusion can be
applied outside of the home, courts have often struggled in its

26. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 10–11, 106–07, 161–64 (2008) (classifying
such laws as governing information collection by surveillance and intrusion).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
28. Helen Nissenbaum, Woodrow Hartzog, Danielle Citron, and Frank Pasquale, to name only a
few, have been writing in this area. See, e.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 1; Danielle Keats Citron &
Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1
(2014); Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 1.
29. For example, some private companies use license plate readers to create databases that they
then sell to other companies and law enforcement. See, e.g., Steve Orr, License Plate Data Is Big
Business, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2014, 5:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/11/02/license-plate-data-is-big-business/18370791/.
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application, and repeatedly avowed that there is no privacy in public.30
A number of scholars have offered new theories of privacy, in
contrast to this idea of privacy as complete withdrawal from the public
world.31 Because conceiving of privacy as withdrawal fails to account
for any expectation of privacy in public, these scholars saw a need to
develop a theory of privacy harm that could justify protection of privacy
outside of the home. Thus they devised newer theories of privacy to
justify the protection of privacy in public. But these theories neglect to
link protection of privacy in public to protection of privacy in private,
ignoring justifiable intuitions that there is a strong government interest in
protecting against surveillance conducted in private places. In other
words, to escape the public-private binary, they disembody privacy from
the physical environment. This is a mistake.
This Part begins by discussing courts’ frequent conceptualization of
private and public as opposites, or a binary, with no overlap in between.
It then turns to several of the scholars who have re-theorized privacy to
address governance of privacy in public. It concludes by examining the
limitations of these newer privacy theories as applied to informationgathering laws.
A.

Privacy as Withdrawal into Private Spaces

Intrusion upon seclusion protects a particularly uncontroversial vision
of privacy, one that is clearly understandable to most people: privacy as
solitude or withdrawal. Not much ink needs to be spilled arguing for a
theory of privacy harm that permits governments to protect individuals
from having their solitude disrupted.32 If you understand the purpose of
privacy protection to be to protect an individual’s ability to withdraw to
private spaces, then the intrusion tort intuitively makes sense.
30. See, e.g., Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970) (“[I]t is
manifest that the mere observation of the plaintiff in a public place does not amount to an invasion
of his privacy.”); Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb.
8, 2006) (finding that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for a privacy claim over art
photographs taken in a public street); McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901,
904 (Tex. App. 1991) (finding no invasion of privacy and strong First Amendment interests “[w]hen
an individual is photographed at a public place for a newsworthy article and that photograph is
published”); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1988) (“[T]here is no liability for
the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff . . . . [Or] for observing him or even
taking his photograph while he is walking on the public highway . . . .” (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. c. (1977))); Aisenson v. Am. Broad. Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388
(Ct. App. 1990) (finding of filming in a public street that any invasion of privacy was “extremely de
minimis”).
31. See infra notes 61–67.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
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In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis called for the law to
recognize a general right to privacy. They famously described privacy as
the “right to be let alone.”33 But Warren and Brandeis’s view of privacy
was expansive—perhaps too expansive—protecting not just the right to
be physically alone when desired, but the right to an “inviolate
personality” from the “too enterprising press, the photographer, or the
possessor of any other modern device for recording or reproducing
scenes or sounds.”34 This more expansive view of privacy included a
right to control the extent to which one’s information was publicized,
which raises First Amendment problems. But the core understanding of
privacy as a right to be let alone is relatively uncontroversial.
Following the Warren and Brandeis Article, U.S. courts recognized a
variety of privacy actions. In 1960, torts scholar William Prosser
famously categorized some 300-plus suits arising from Warren and
Brandeis’s right to privacy as four torts: intrusion upon seclusion; public
disclosure of private fact; false light; and appropriation.35 Before
Prosser’s taxonomy, there was more variety in litigation but less national
coverage; states recognized more causes of action, but fewer states
recognized privacy torts.36 Now nearly every state recognizes Prosser’s
four privacy torts.37 But the spread of Prosser’s torts also “fossilized” the
development of U.S. privacy law, restricting the development of other
related causes of action, like breach of confidence.38
Prosser’s taxonomy has been much criticized. Some criticism arises
from the tension between the disclosure torts and freedom of speech—a
tension Prosser himself recognized.39 Penalizing information distribution
runs headlong into protection of free speech. Others criticize the Prosser
taxonomy as failing to reach privacy problems of the information age.40
33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 193.
34. Id. at 205–06.
35. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
36. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1887, 1895, 1913 (2010) (pointing out that by the time of Prosser’s Article, only a minority of
states recognized privacy torts, but that the breadth of the understanding of privacy “germinated
countless new torts to redress a variety of related yet distinct harms”).
37. ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 77 (2001) (observing that
every state but North Dakota and Wyoming recognizes the privacy torts in either statute or at
common law).
38. Richards & Solove, supra note 36, at 1904 (“[W]hile Prosser gave tort privacy a legitimacy it
had previously lacked, he also fossilized it and eliminated its capacity to change and develop.”).
39. Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357, 365
(2011) (discussing the tension between disclosure torts and the First Amendment).
40. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1810 (2010);
Richards & Solove, supra note 36, at 1889.
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The Prosser torts do, in practice, enforce a limited conception of
privacy.41 Courts have tended to rely on a privacy binary: information is
either withdrawn and thus private, or available to others and thus
public.42 Once information is shared with others under this rubric, it can
no longer be protected as private.
While some courts appear to recognize a more contextualized
understanding of privacy—for example, a court found that a person’s
HIV status could still be considered private information even though it
had been shared with more than sixty people43—that contextualized
understanding often relies on the sensitivity of the type of information at
issue. If information is health information, or related to the naked body,
or otherwise falls into a category of information courts recognize as
inherently sensitive, then sharing that information with other people or
being in a public space does not necessarily make the information nonprivate in nature.44
The intrusion upon seclusion tort exemplifies the privacy binary:
liability arises when individuals transgress into a private space.45 It is
possible for intrusion to take place in public, because “there may be
some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that
are not exhibited to the public gaze.”46 But many courts afford no
liability, for example, for an image captured on a public street.47 Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence until very recently echoed this reasoning: “A
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”48 While some courts have adopted a more nuanced view, until

41. Richards & Solove, supra note 36, at 1920 (observing that in applying the Prosser torts,
“courts have relied upon antiquated and narrow understandings of privacy. . . . ‘There can be no
privacy in that which is already public’” (quoting Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal.
1953))).
42. Id. (noting that “privacy becomes an all-or-nothing affair, something that makes privacy
virtually impossible in today’s world where it is increasingly difficult (if not impossible) to keep
much information completely hidden away”).
43. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
44. See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (protecting as private
a woman’s underwear when her skirt flew up at a funhouse ride).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (explaining that liability arises only
when individuals violate private space or private seclusion).
46. Id.
47. See generally supra note 30.
48. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,
450–51 (1989) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy where a greenhouse was visible by
helicopter from navigable airspace 400 feet in the air); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–
41 (1988) (“[H]aving deposited their garbage ‘in an area particularly suited for public inspection
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very recently, the Supreme Court has tended to address privacy through
this binary framework.49
The historic tendency to view privacy and publicity in a binary
framework runs broader than the application of the privacy torts. In both
legal and political theory, the terms “private” and “public” often mark a
dichotomy, rather than ends on a spectrum.50 The private sphere is
personal, intimate, even familial, while the public sphere usually
involves civic participation and governance.
Within this binary, privacy can be, and often is, demarcated along
physical lines. People withdraw to private spaces; hence U.S. privacy
jurisprudence repeatedly recognizes the special nature of the home. 51 Or
the private-public binary can instead focus on the kind of information at
issue, requiring protection for intimate or sensitive information.52 But
neither understanding of privacy—as protecting privileged spaces, or
protecting privileged information—accounts for protection of privacy in
ordinary information incidentally revealed outside the home.
In fact, the revelation of ordinary information outside of the home is
often used in both privacy jurisprudence and in philosophical debates as
the easily dismissed pole of the privacy-publicity binary.53 Even those
and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take
it,’ respondents could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they
discarded.” (citation omitted)); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy where marijuana plants were visible from 1000 feet in the air);
United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 930 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[S]hredding garbage and placing it in the
public domain subjects it to the same risks regarding privacy, as engaging in a private conversation
in public where it is subject to the possibility that it may be overheard by other persons. Both are
failed attempts at maintaining privacy whose failure can only be attributed to the conscious
acceptance by the actor of obvious risk factors.”). But see United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 945 (2012) (finding that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for applying a GPS
tracker to a car).
49. Id. State constitutions have been found, by contrast, to protect privacy even in public spaces.
See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 150 Wash. 2d 251, 276–77, 76 P.3d 217, 231 (2003) (Washington State
Supreme Court protecting against remote GPS tracking); State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 581,
800 P.2d 1112, 1117 (1990) (finding a valid privacy interest in trash).
50. Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 584.
51. Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352–53 (7th Cir. 1995)
(distinguishing Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971)); see also Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 10, at 202 n.1 (noting that English courts held sacred the right to privacy
within the home).
52. See generally Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
53. See, e.g., Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 271, 281 (1977)
(defining privacy as an “island of personal autonomy” limited to the “intimacies of personal
identity”); W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 271 (1983)
(stating that all other information “cannot without glaring paradox be called private”). Nissenbaum
calls this the “normative knock-down argument.” Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 575, 587.
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advancing a more complex understanding of privacy will concede that
privacy “does not assert a right never to be seen even on a crowded
street.”54 That concession, however, has come under significant scrutiny
recently, in both scholarship and jurisprudence.
B.

Privacy in Public

Evolving technology has driven a parallel evolution in legal
understandings of privacy in public.55 The simple public phone booth
forced the Supreme Court to re-evaluate its earlier conclusion that
privacy would be protected only in the home. The Court instead delinked
privacy protection from trespass, and devised its Fourth Amendment
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test, also known as the Katz test.56
Cellular telephones and their ability to cheaply and easily film and
photograph activity in public have driven the enactment of voyeurism
laws.57 Now drones and their ability to achieve perspectives once
attainable only by aircraft or crane have driven states to enactment drone
privacy laws.58
Scholars have proposed competing theories of privacy to push back
against the binary conceptualization of information as either completely
withdrawn, or completely available. Often, these competing
conceptualizations have been used to address the question of privacy in
public.
There is considerable support for why information revealed in public
should be protected from government surveillance. Extensive
surveillance can produce both conformity and anxiety.59 When the
government wields public surveillance as a tool, this shifts the balance of
power between citizens and government, and makes citizens less able to
effect democratic change.60 Under a variety of constitutional
justifications—stemming from both the Fourth Amendment and the First
Amendment—it can be argued that ordinary activities performed in
54. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 44 (1976).
55. See, e.g., Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 576.
56. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
57. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012).
58. Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4
CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 57, 57–59 (2013); Calo, supra note 22.
59. Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications
of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 483–93 (2014).
60. Id.; see also Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 237–52 (2002).
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public should be protected from government surveillance.61
However, when private citizens conduct surveillance on other private
citizens, the question of privacy harm becomes more complicated.
Surveillance by private actors poses the challenge of balancing
individual rights.62 A subject’s right to be free from surveillance comes
into conflict with the right of the observer to gather information, or to
merely observe and remember.63 A more precise explanation of public
privacy harms is necessary; one capable of distinguishing between
different degrees of harm.
One way to understand privacy harms involving information gathered
in public is to look to harms associated with data use—that is, privatesector data-mining. Writing about privacy in public, Helen Nissenbaum
explained that “people have a robust sense of the information about them
that is relevant, appropriate, or proper to particular circumstances,
situations, or relationships.”64 They choose to reveal information under
particular circumstances, expecting that it will not travel beyond those
settings.
The privacy harm occurs when information is decontextualized, and
moved into another setting despite norms suggesting it will not be
moved. Nissenbaum argued that this theory of what she terms
“contextual integrity” is critical to understanding why we should protect
privacy in public.65 Nissenbaum explains that privacy, understood as
contextual integrity, is crucial to the ability to “define the nature and
degree of closeness of relationships,” which in turn is “an important
aspect of personal autonomy.”66
Nissenbaum’s characterization of information privacy as contextual
integrity has been a particularly influential alternative to the privacy

61. Slobogin, supra note 60, at 252–72. See generally David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A
Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013); Margot E. Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name
Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815 (2013); Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004).
62. Kaminski, supra note 58, at 62–63; Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 571 (“[P]rotecting privacy
for one person inevitably leads to restraints on the freedom of another or others, or may even result
in harms to them.”).
63. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse,
and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 337 (2011). See generally Bambauer, supra note
4.
64. Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 581.
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id. at 22.
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binary.67 The theory of contextual integrity currently plays a crucial role
in policy conversations about big data and privacy; the May 2014 White
House Report on Big Data refers to the idea of a “no surprises” rule for
data use.68 Data should not be used out of context in a way that would
surprise the data subject. And there are portions of U.S. jurisprudence
that support contextual integrity as an applied theory.69
But a theory of privacy as contextual integrity focuses on the
processing of data rather than the gathering of it. Contextual integrity
emphasizes concerns over shifting information from one context to
another, and collating information to reveal patterns.70 Surveillance in
public is problematic under this rubric because it enables both
decontextualization and collation; but surveillance by itself is not
necessarily problematic in the absence of data use. Contextual integrity
thus poses a strong argument for why information revealed in public
should not be moved or manipulated, but only secondarily explains why
it should not be gathered in the first place.
When it comes to evaluating existing surveillance laws, contextual
integrity is not descriptively accurate, and struggles as a guide for
legislators. Descriptively, many of the laws governing private
information gathering do not address either decontextualization or
collation; they often don’t discuss data use or misuse.71 They focus
instead on the moment of information collection itself. As a guide for
new legislation, contextual integrity is challenging. Legislators would
have to either delegate heavily to courts to determine when a “surprise”
about data use is problematic, or would have to devise laws that are
tailored to or responsive to information norms varying across a vast
multitude of social situations. For example, let’s say that an individual
67. NISSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 2–3 (2010).
68. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES 56 (2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_
privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf; Alexis C. Madrigal, The Philosopher Whose Fingerprints Are All
Over the FTC’s New Approach to Privacy, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/the-philosopher-whose-fingerprints-are-allover-the-ftcs-new-approach-to-privacy/254365/.
69. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
165–66 (2002). See generally Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO
L. REV. 643 (2013).
70. Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 19.
71. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-61(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining
“peeping Tom” as one “who peeps through windows or doors, or other like places . . . for the
purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of the persons spied upon and the doing of any other
acts of a similar nature which invade the privacy of such persons”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977).
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has his picture taken while walking into a pet store on a relatively quiet
street. Does it violate contextual integrity for that information to be sent
to PETA? To his mother? To an advertiser for pet goods? It is hard to
determine at what point the reuse or distribution of a piece of
information becomes problematic, and with respect to whom.
Joel Reidenberg recently revisited this problem of privacy in public,
arguing for a theoretical shift from a binary conception of privacy to
demarcation along “governance-related” and “non-governance related”
lines.72 Observing how ill-equipped the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” approach is for dealing with problems of the information age,
Reidenberg proposes what he deems a variation on Nissenbaum’s
theory.73 He suggests that courts should apply a “public significance
filter” to determine whether information is private or not; if it is about
governance, it is not private, and if it is not about governance, it is
private.74 Reidenberg explains that this filter will preserve journalistic
uses of important information and thus poses no First Amendment
concerns.75
Distinctions between private and newsworthy information, or
information of “public concern,” abound in privacy law.76 Reidenberg’s
suggested filter thus has the benefit of resonating with both recent
historical examples and some case law. However, it fails to provide a
workable theory of privacy for prohibitions on information gathering for
three reasons. First, like Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity, the
private-unless-newsworthy framework does not reflect how legislators
have actually been drafting surveillance laws. Most surveillance laws
protect as private a segment of information narrower than allinformation-that-is-not-newsworthy. Second, the idea of protecting
information as private unless it has a nexus with governance has been
rejected by a number of courts concerned with restricting newsgathering,
or freedom of expression more generally.77 And third, it is often difficult
to distinguish between high-value, newsworthy information and private
information.78 To be fair, the Supreme Court has occasionally hinted that

72. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141 (2014).
73. Id. at 155.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 158.
76. For example, there is a newsworthiness exception to the tort of public disclosure of private
fact. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669–70 (Ct. App. 1984); Shulman
v. Grp. W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998).
77. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1953).
78. See Bambauer, supra note 4, at 97–100 (discussing the importance of types of information
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distinctions between newsworthy and private information may matter,79
but the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in general is wary of
distinctions between high and low value speech.80 Requiring courts to
assess just how newsworthy information is leads into an age-old conflict
between privacy and the First Amendment—and it is not clear that
surveillance laws need embody that conflict, or at least be placed so
squarely in its crosshairs.
C.

The Need for a New Approach

We need a new way to understand the government interest in
surveillance laws, but that approach need not throw out everything
useful about older frameworks. While the privacy binary is unworkable
when it comes to discussing privacy in public, the understanding of
privacy as seclusion or withdrawal has the benefit of resonating with
fundamental intuitions, derived from social experience. The home is
special from a privacy perspective; other private spaces can be special,
too. Using withdrawal tactics, whether by hiding behind walls or
keeping information within a close circle of friends, indicates that an
individual believes information is more private.81 Useful and
longstanding intuitions about privacy should not be abandoned simply
because they have given rise to reductionist understandings of when
information is private. Rather than departing from the strength of the
seclusion model, we should ask how seclusion relates to attempts to
protect privacy in non-secluded spaces. Identifying what was valuable in
past privacy intuitions is particularly important as boundaries between
home and not-home, and the physical and online world, become fuzzier
and more fluid in light of technological and social change.
Private surveillance laws are similar to each other, not solely because
they focus on the moment at which information is collected. They
operationalize the same government interest, albeit of different degrees
of strength. This Article argues that the government interest in private

beyond newsworthy information).
79. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
80. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of
free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative
social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people
that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”). Contra Shulman, 955
P.2d at 479 (“We therefore agree with defendants that under California common law the
dissemination of truthful, newsworthy material is not actionable as a publication of private facts.”).
81. For a discussion of such withdrawal tactics in the digital space, see Hartzog & Stutzman,
supra note 1, at 14.
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surveillance laws is an interest in enabling individuals to engage in
boundary management at the moment or moments information gathering
occurs. Thus, the government has an interest not just in preventing the
reuse or distribution of data; it has an interest in limiting and sometimes
preventing data collection.
III.

PRIVACY AS BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT

Laws that prohibit private surveillance protect the government’s
interest in enabling individuals to engage in boundary management in
physical space, including by using the physical features of that space.
These laws are sensitive to the contexts created in and using the physical
environment. The state interest in enabling boundary management exists
in both private and public spaces. The similarity between these laws
shows that legislators do understand privacy as existing on a continuum,
not a binary: The government interest in protecting individuals in public
is the same kind of interest invoked in protecting privacy in private
spaces.
These laws do not identify a particular type of information as private
information. Instead, they enable individuals to negotiate relationships
with other people—including strangers—by relying on known features
of their environment. Sometimes a law enables effective relationship
navigation by requiring notice of surveillance, which enables an
individual to adapt her behavior (at least in theory, since in practice
behavior often cannot be adapted due to economic or social necessity).
Sometimes a law enables boundary management by preserving an
environment or context as free from recording. These laws thus can
appear at first glance conservative—some, after all, are aimed at keeping
things the way they were before the introduction of new surveillance
technology. But the government interest is not just in abstract
conservation: It is in preventing concrete shifts in behavior resulting
from changes to the environment.
The framing of privacy as boundary management has been addressed
elsewhere in the legal literature, but it has not been applied where it
naturally fits: to identify the government interest in surveillance laws
governing interactions between private actors in physical, rather than
online, space. Boundary management has been referenced in the legal
literature in the online context,82 and to provide a general definition of
82. Paul Dourish & Leysia Palen, Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked World, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM CHI 2003 HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS CONFERENCE
129 (2003); Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 1.
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privacy.83 It has not been applied at any length, however, to existing
real-world surveillance laws.
A.

The Boundary Management Framework

Boundary management is a concept developed by social psychologist
Irwin Altman in the 1970s.84 Altman worked in the field of environment
and behavior studies (now known as environment-behavior studies),
which considers the connection between environmental design and
psychological development. Altman’s conceptualization of privacy
emerged from studies of crowding, personal space, territoriality, and
other human behavior that uses or responds to features of the physical
environment in the regulation of social relationships.85
Altman observed that people interact with others within their
environment as part of an optimizing process.86 People attempt to
maintain “an optimal degree of desired access of the self to others at any
moment in time.”87 This optimizing process is what Altman terms
privacy. It is not static nor binary, but dynamic and dialectic.88 Altman’s
idea of privacy is the dynamic regulation of exposure along a “range of
openness-closedness of the person or group,” shifting over time and
circumstances.89 In other words, people dynamically navigate actions
and interactions with an ideal of disclosure to others in mind.
Boundary management can be a useful framework for discussing
information privacy.90 However, Altman’s observations are particularly
helpful for understanding privacy governance in the physical world. The
83. Julie Cohen employs Altman’s theory as the foundation of her definition of privacy. See Julie
E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1927 (2013) [hereinafter Cohen, What
Privacy Is For] (“[P]rivacy in the dynamic sense is ‘an interest in breathing room to engage in
socially situated processes of boundary management.’” (quoting the definition developed in her
book, JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–20, 107–26, 149 (2012) [hereinafter COHEN, CONFIGURING THE
NETWORKED SELF])).
84. See generally ALTMAN, supra note 6.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id.
88. Dourish & Palen, supra note 82, at 1 (describing Altman’s “model of privacy as a dynamic,
dialectic process”).
89. Nathan Witte, Privacy: Architecture in Support of Privacy Regulation (May 16, 2003),
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=ucin1053701814&disposition=inline.
90. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, supra note 83, at 149; Dourish & Palen, supra
note 82; Woodrow Hartzog & Fred Stutzman, Boundary Regulation in Social Media, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 2012 CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK
769 (2012), available at http://fredstutzman.com/papers/CSCW2012_Stutzman.pdf.
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concept of boundary management stems from observations about how
people interact in—and use features of—physical space. Because of its
connection to the physical environment, Altman’s theory best explains
the government’s interest in a variety of laws governing information
capture in the physical world.91
According to Altman, people use a wide variety of strategies and
mechanisms to achieve the optimal degree of access at a given moment.
These strategies or mechanisms include verbal behavior, paraverbal
behavior (such as tone of voice), nonverbal behavior (such as
movements), personal space, territory (including the use of objects in a
particular locale), and cultural mechanisms.92 Boundary management
mechanisms include the use of environmental artifacts like doors and
walls. If you want to be secluded, you hide behind a wall. If you want to
be open to one person, but not to everyone else, you have your
conversation with that one person very quietly, or within closed walls
that exclude everybody else. But boundary management mechanisms
also include decisions about the duration of the interaction (time), the
depth of the interaction (how much you say), the truthfulness of the
interaction (whether you lie), and the use of nonverbal cues (refusing to
make eye contact) or cultural tropes (using an expression or making a
joke) to indicate withdrawal or engagement. All of these mechanisms are
used to regulate how much of the self is accessible to other people in a
given interaction.
Removing physical boundaries does not make people abstain from
boundary management. Instead, removing physical boundaries often
results in people changing their use of behavioral mechanisms. If you
take away a wall, people may employ other forms of cover or
withdrawal, such as wearing more clothing,93 saying less, or engaging in
culturally taught mechanisms of withdrawal. Taking away one
mechanism (the wall) can cause an individual to use another (lying).
Altman observed this relationship between boundary management
mechanisms across cultures. People across different cultures still try to
optimize their social accessibility, but “what differs among cultures is
the particular configuration of mechanisms the people use.”94 Thus even

91. It can also explain how people behave in networked or digital spaces, but there the
mechanisms are often metaphors, and genres of boundary management are arguably less wellestablished.
92. ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 11.
93. Id. at 36–37 (people use clothing to “tell the world who they are, to help define situations, and
to reflect their status roles. . . . People also use clothing to signal their approachability”).
94. Irwin Altman, A Personal Perspective on the Environment and Behavior Field, in VISIONS OF
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cultures that at first glance appear not to value privacy in the binary
sense of full withdrawal will use other “behavioral mechanisms for
managing the social accessibility of people to one another.”95 Individuals
in a culture that does not generally prioritize private rooms may instead
navigate boundary management by being more socially withdrawn at
home.
A crucial feature of boundary management is that it takes place across
the dimension of time. Regulating the accessibility of the self to others is
not a one-time decision. It entails calculations concerning duration,
repetition, and frequency of exposure. It also often entails relying on the
ephemeral nature of interactions, and the imperfection of human
memory.96
Effective boundary management depends not only on observed
features of humans in general, but on knowledge of one’s relationship
with a particular person. People tend to increase self-disclosure where a
person reciprocates, unless they expect nonreciprocal behavior because
that person fills a particular social role (e.g., of teacher, priest,
therapist).97 Self-disclosure tends to be at its highest early on in a
relationship.98 People also tend to increase self-disclosure when they
trust somebody not to reveal that information to a third party. Respect of
the “dyadic boundary”—“the boundary within which it is safe to
disclose to the invited recipient and across which the self-disclosure will
not pass”—may increase disclosure.99 Thus, perceptions of the person to
whom one is disclosing information—their trustworthiness or social
role—can affect the extent of a person’s optimal level of openness
towards that person.
Boundary management is highly dependent on context, but this does
not mean that people always take the time to figure out the precise
nature of the context of an interaction. People use shortcuts. They often
resort to familiar patterns of behavior, based on learned assumptions
about their environment. Scholars have called these patterns “genres of
AESTHETICS, THE ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT 118 (Roger M. Downs et al. eds., 1991); see
also ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 12–17.
95. ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 12.
96. Dourish & Palen, supra note 82, at 2 (noting that “the recordability and subsequent
persistence of information, especially that which was once ephemeral, means that audiences can
exist not only in the present, but in the future as well”).
97. VALERIAN J. DERLEGA & ALAN L. CHAIKIN, SHARING INTIMACY: WHAT WE REVEAL TO
OTHERS AND WHY 108 (1975).
98. Valerian Derlega & Alan Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social Relationships, 33 J.
SOC. ISSUES 102, 102–15 (1977).
99. Id. at 104.
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disclosure.”100 Genres in this context are the “regularly reproduced
arrangements of people, technology and practice that yield identifiable
and socially meaningful styles of interaction.”101 People learn to resort to
a particular genre of disclosure, depending on past practice and on cues
given by their environment. A person might act a particular way in the
classroom, another way on a public street, and yet another way in a
public but secluded park. That person might use social and physical cues
to resort to a park genre of behavior, a school genre of behavior, and so
forth.
Genres of disclosure evolve as technology and social practices
change.102 For example, where once people might have assumed that an
action in the London streets would not be recorded, now they may be
aware of the prevalence of CCTV cameras, and act accordingly. Instead
of acting within the old genre of public street behavior that was
appropriate when there were no cameras, they may now act as though
other people are watching. There can be a significant government
interest in either preserving certain genres of disclosure, or in alerting
people so that they do not inaccurately rely on a past genre once
circumstances have changed.
B.

The Government’s Interest in Boundary Management

Altman’s theory of privacy as boundary management is a strong
foundation for understanding the government interest or interests behind
private surveillance laws. This section builds on Altman’s theory of
privacy as boundary management to identify the government’s interest
in enacting surveillance laws. The government interest implicated by
framing privacy as boundary management is twofold. First, the
government may have an interest in preventing people from
miscalculating their boundaries. Second, the government may have an
interest in preserving a particular genre of boundary management—not
out of nostalgia or fear of technological change, but because of the
problems that might occur if one forces people to shift boundary
management tactics.

100. Dourish & Palen, supra note 82, at 5.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Allowing an Individual to Calculate Her Desired Degree of
Disclosure

The government has an interest in preventing people from
miscalculating their degree of disclosure. This interest is implicated
when a person has a desired degree of openness to the world, but
miscalculates her use of management mechanisms based on settled
expectations about her environment. For example, a person might do a
silly dance in her office every morning before sitting down to answer
emails, relying on boundary management mechanisms such as walls and
having an office on the fourth floor to prevent other people from seeing
her. But if a drone is able to capture that silly dance through the fourth
story window, then the person may want to change her calculation of
socially optimal behavior based on new understandings of her
environment.
As our environments change around us, due to developments in both
technology and social practice, the government may have a strong
interest in alerting us to those changes by requiring notice. Requiring
notice allows the surveillance subject to recalculate her mechanisms for
maintaining an optimized balance of openness and closedness in a given
environment. Notice and consent are thus an important aspect of many
information capture statutes. Notice can also trigger social enforcement
through shaming of the person conducting surveillance. An unobserved
observer may be less subject to the pull of social norms, but an
announced observer can be subjected to shaming.
2.

Preventing Undesirable Behavioral Changes

The government can also have an interest in preserving a particular
genre of boundary management. Recall that people often resort to
shortcuts based on past experiences, triggered by environmental cues.
When shortcuts invoke site-specific or person-specific patterns, they can
be described as genres of boundary management (e.g., behaving
different ways in public, at the mall, in church, in one’s home, at one’s
office).103 The government can have an interest in preserving a genre of
behavior, not because the genre itself is particularly valuable (although it
can be), but because the alternative could have significant consequences.
Altman observed that people substitute mechanisms to maintain an ideal

103. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). Another
way to understand Goffman’s masks is as genres of boundary management, directed at different
audiences and triggered by both environmental cues and the nature of one’s understood audience.
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level of openness or closedness. If a person lacks a wall, they may
change their verbal, paraverbal, or nonverbal behavior instead. The silly
dancer of the earlier example may modify her behavior—that is, stop
dancing—to maintain the same level of openness-closedness, and there
may be costs attributable to that behavioral change. Silly dancing might
be necessary for productivity, or have an expressive value, or form part
of that person’s definition of herself. For any of these reasons, the
government may have an interest in preserving a genre of boundary
management, and preventing the surveillance subject from shifting
behavior to reach the same level of optimization.
Take the example of laws prohibiting up-skirt photography, discussed
more fully in Part V.A.1 below. The government interest in prohibiting
up-skirt photography in public places is not limited to the protection of a
particular type of private information (that is, what’s under the skirt), or
an interest in protecting the dignitary interests of the observed. It is also
an interest in genre preservation. In pluralistic American society, we
envision public spaces as a place where people can wear many different
types of clothing. Permitting surreptitious up-skirt photography likely
will not cause women to recalibrate their optimal degree of nudity in
public. More likely, it will cause a shift in the boundary management
mechanisms deployed, and more women will stop wearing skirts and
wear more conservative coverings instead. The government has a
legitimate interest in preventing that behavioral shift, thus preserving a
pluralistic public space.104
The government interest in preventing an undesirable shift in
behavior can be particularly important when it comes to speech
concerns. The government may have an interest in enacting laws to
guard a trustworthy relationship or conversation. Protection of this sort
can encourage disclosure within that conversation, and avoid a resulting
chill in speech.105
The government’s interest in bolstering or reinstating older
mechanisms for boundary management is thus not based solely on
nostalgia. The government interest can be articulated as a desire to
prevent shifts to different kinds of boundary management mechanisms.
If Altman is correct that in the absence of physical mechanisms, people
optimize their social accessibility through decisions to speak or not

104. It also can have a legitimate interest in protecting the individual from dignitary harms and an
inability to self-define through clothing. These are related but not identical to the boundary
management interest.
105. DERLEGA & CHAIKIN, supra note 97.
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speak, to repress, or to more closely follow cultural patterns,106 then the
government may be interested in preventing those kinds of behavioral
shifts in certain contexts.
Scholars have observed that law often steps in where new
technologies disrupt the environment in which behavior takes place.
Orin Kerr recently noted, for example, that new technologies can disrupt
the balance of power between individuals and the government by
lowering costs of surveillance.107 Courts adjust Fourth Amendment
doctrine in light of new technologies to preserve the status quo balance
of power. Harry Surden has similarly written about the need to recognize
implicit “structural rights” to privacy: rights that are structurally
provided by the physical environment and erased by new
technologies.108 An example of a “structural right” would be the
existence of a physical wall. When technology enables individuals to
look through a wall, then law can step in to provide a legal barrier where
formerly there was a structural, environmental barrier.
But both of these views focus on law as a constraint, whether on law
enforcement or on private actors. They emphasize the government’s
interest in replacing physical environmental restrictions with legal ones.
In Surden’s case, this builds on Lawrence Lessig’s conception of
governance as including norms, architecture, the market, and the law.109
Where physical architecture changes, the reasoning goes, law might step
in to achieve the same constraints on behavior.
Framing privacy as boundary management shifts the focus. Instead of
asking whether there is a government interest in maintaining a particular
status quo level of constraints on the observer’s actions, the focus
instead is on the value of the law to the observed. The government
interest is not just in technophobically preserving a particular
environmental balance; it is in enabling observed individuals to rely on
and use features of their environment in self-developing ways.
Recharacterizing the government interest in private surveillance laws
should help courts shift away from examining whether the information at
issue is adequately private within the private-public binary. Instead,
courts can understand privacy laws as empowering individuals to modify
their behavior, or protecting individuals from having to modify their
behavior at all. It shifts the focus from assessing whether a particular
106. ALTMAN, supra note 6, at 12.
107. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 478 (2011).
108. Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 101, 101 (2007).
109. Id. at 103.
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piece of information is inherently sensitive to looking to the impact of
technological changes on individual autonomy and behavior.
These government interests will not, and should not, always be
considered adequate. But it is important that courts understand that
government interests go beyond preserving privacy in secluded spaces,
or preserving privacy in sensitive information. The interest in protecting
boundary management is an interest in enabling self-development and
preventing cultural shifts that will occur if the law does not step in.
The underlying value of boundary management thus is tied to how
one conceives of and values the individual self in society. Boundary
management sits naturally with the liberal idea of the autonomous self,
which should not be unduly restricted from making choices. But
boundary management can also sit comfortably with a more complicated
idea of a non-liberal self.110 The non-liberal self is not isolated or stable
like the liberal self, but is in constant development, influenced by and
influencing other people and society.111 One value of the boundary
management framework is that it can be used with either conception of
the self, liberal or not, which lets it both fit within dominant legal and
political theory, and rest comfortably with criticisms of that theory.
C.

Enabling Boundary Management Protects Important Social
Values

Protecting individuals’ ability to boundary-manage can protect
important social values. Enabling boundary management respects
individual autonomy. It allows for the formation of valuable
relationships by enabling trust. It prevents conformity, which is valuable
for purposes of self-governance.112 It allows for the formation of both
individual and community identities.113 It prevents chilling effects,
power imbalances, vulnerability harms, and relationship harms.114 In
short, the values implicated by protecting or enabling boundary
management are compelling. Governments may enact these laws from a
wide variety of philosophical perspectives; and protecting individuals
from boundary management harms can be understood to serve a wide
110. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, supra note 83, at 1905 (“[T]he liberal self who is the subject of
privacy theory and privacy policymaking does not exist . . . . [T]he self who is the real subject of
privacy law and policy is socially constructed . . . .”).
111. Id. at 1906.
112. Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 59.
113. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 957–59 (1989).
114. SOLOVE, supra note 26, at 174–79 (listing these harms and more).
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variety of values.
IV.

POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT

The most significant criticism of boundary management is that it can
evince a bias against technological change. When legislators enact laws
to preserve particular genres of boundary management, this argument
goes, they are refusing to let society evolve. It can be hard to distinguish
between Luddites who unreasonably and vaguely fear new technologies,
and people who want to protect genuine privacy interests. As
Nissenbaum has noted, “critics may argue that it is simply a matter of
time before people will become accustomed to the new order brought
about by information technology and readily accept the new privacy
conventions of public surveillance.”115
The boundary management framework is explicitly not, however,
about preserving the status quo for preservation’s sake. It requires
legislators to consider why they want to preserve a particular genre of
boundary management around certain information or in a particular
location or against a particular technology. It focuses on real concerns
that individuals will shift their behavior in the absence of legal
intervention. It may be that some behavioral shifts are not worth
preventing. But it is abundantly clear that behavioral shifts do occur as a
result of surveillance, and that some carry real harms to a pluralistic
democratic society.116 A legislature can have a legitimate interest in
preventing those shifts.
Requiring notice can be a less restrictive way to address boundary
management interests rather than prohibiting recording entirely.
Prohibiting surreptitious recording effectively requires notice by making
surveillance legal only when the recorder notifies her subject.
Surveillance laws built on a boundary management framework are in
fact less conservative than banning surveillance involving, say, a
particular type of information. Boundary management laws shift the
cultural decision about a desirable level of privacy from the legislature
to the individual who is being observed. The laws centering on notice let
individuals calibrate an ideal level of disclosure, rather than relying on
the legislature to identify a “sensitive” category of information. Such
laws allow for more flexibility for normative change over time.
A different line of criticism stems from the healthy skepticism privacy
scholars have for reliance on self-management in the privacy context.
115. Nissenbaum, supra note 5, at 583.
116. See, e.g., Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 59.
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Giving notice and control to individuals often does not work because of
market failures, individuals’ misplaced optimism, and inherent
misunderstandings about big data.117 However, prohibitions on
surveillance need not take the place of data privacy regimes aimed at
protecting even those individuals who have failed to accurately calibrate
their privacy preferences at the moment information is gathered. The
two types of laws—surveillance laws and data regulation—are
complimentary, not substitutes.
V.

BENEFITS OF THE BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK

The government’s interest in preventing private surveillance is an
interest in enabling or preserving boundary management by the
individual being observed. This understanding of the privacy interest at
stake has four benefits: First, it descriptively maps onto existing
surveillance laws. Second, it allows courts to more clearly articulate the
government interest at stake in these laws, instead of just referring
vaguely to privacy. Third, it shows that private surveillance laws can
protect First Amendment interests, rather than just be in conflict with
them. Boundary management suggests that people disclose more when
they trust that information will not travel; and in fact, several courts
appear to understand this. Fourth, the boundary management framework
will enable legislators to more thoughtfully enact new surveillance laws,
governing new technologies.
A.

Descriptive Accuracy

The boundary management framework is descriptively accurate:
Legislators have in fact enacted a range of laws that enable individuals
to dynamically manage their desired degree of disclosure by using or
relying on features of their environments.
The oldest examples of these laws are relatively well-known and
perhaps the most intuitive. They address the breach of physical barriers

117. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters,
Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV 743; Daniel J. Solove,
Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880
(2013) (“Privacy self-management takes refuge in consent. It attempts to be neutral about
substance . . . and instead focuses on whether people consent to various privacy practices. Consent
legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal data. Although privacy selfmanagement is certainly a laudable and necessary component of any regulatory regime, I contend
that it is being tasked with doing work beyond its capabilities.”).
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such as walls, either through physical trespass or by looking or listening
through an aperture such as a window. These laws could be overlooked
as irrelevant to conversations about privacy in public, because
functionally they protect private spaces. That would be a mistake. These
laws do not merely protect a particular location; they bolster physical
barriers with legal barriers, so that individuals can rely on walls to
prevent disclosure. This is the same function that other surveillance laws
serve, just in different contexts and spaces, and with other boundarymanagement mechanisms.
A second type of boundary management law addresses technologies
that use sense-enhancement or an unusual perspective to create, not
physical, but constructive holes in the wall.118 Instead of focusing on a
physical barrier, these laws target technologies that alter the object of
surveillance’s degree of expected disclosure without providing notice.
These are also boundary management laws. They provide legal
protection to ensure that a person accurately calculates her degree of
disclosure in light of the presence of technologies that unexpectedly
widen the potential audience for her behavior.
A third type of surveillance law also addresses the use of technology
instead of the physical breach of physical walls. But instead of focusing
on the use of technology to enter into a private sphere unnoticed or from
afar, these laws focus on the use of technology to alter the ephemerality
of interactions. These laws target recording. Laws that target recording
are a type of boundary management law, because ephemerality is a
feature of the environment that individuals rely on when calculating their
ideal degree of disclosure. Impermanence over time is, in other words, a
barrier people rely on in social interactions in the real world. When
recording technologies make interactions more permanent, an
individual’s calculation of optimal disclosure within an interaction and
over time will change.
1.

Private Spaces and Physical Barriers

Earlier privacy laws address the breach of physical barriers through
physical or sensory entrance into a physical space. These laws preserve a
person’s ability to rely on walls or clothing as barriers against unwanted
118. I draw on California’s paparazzi law in distinguishing between physical and constructive
invasions of privacy. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a)–(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.) (“A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the defendant knowingly enters
onto the land of another person without permission . . . . A person is liable for constructive invasion
of privacy when the defendant attempts to capture [recordings or images] . . . through the use of any
device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass . . . .”).
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observers. They prevent nosy intruders from taking advantage of
unobserved apertures, such as windows.
One of the earliest boundary management laws, eavesdropping, was a
nuisance at common law. William Blackstone defined eavesdropping as
a combination of information gathering and dissemination.119 To
eavesdrop, as Blackstone defined it, was to “listen under walls or
windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and
thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales.”120 The
information-gathering portion of the eavesdropping offense clearly goes
to boundary management. Banning listening in through walls, windows,
or eaves provides legal reinforcement to the physical barriers of a house.
The law stepped in to supplement physical boundaries, and to enable
people within the home to trust that their walls, windows, and eaves
effectively bordered a safe space for disclosure. The offense of
eavesdropping is thus, at its heart, about boundary management, and
goes to preserving the genre of actions and interactions in the home.
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion, like eavesdropping, often
governs boundary management in a physical space. The tort entails an
intentional intrusion that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.121
Although intrusion upon seclusion does not identify particular
boundaries or particular technological means of transgressing them, the
tort centers on the law stepping in to reinforce a physical or normative
boundary that has been transgressed.
Intrusion upon seclusion does not necessarily govern a specific space,
barrier, or technology. In practice, however, courts have often limited
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to protecting a private space—a
space where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy or seclusion.
Many courts afford no liability, for example, for image capture on a
public street.122 However, the Restatement definition of the tort notes
that there are some matters, even in public, that have not been submitted
to the public gaze and therefore may be private.123
Peeping Tom laws demonstrate a narrower form of boundary
management governance. In Peeping Tom laws, the state legislature,

119. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169.
120. Id.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
122. Id. at cmt. c (explaining that liability arises only when individuals violate private space or
private seclusion).
123. Id. (“Even in a public place, however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as
his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze, and there may still be invasion
of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”).
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rather than courts, identifies the boundary that cannot be transgressed.
This makes the laws more specific and less flexible. A number of
Peeping Tom laws define the offense as peering through windows,
doors, or other apertures.124 Commenters explain that these statutes can
be of limited practical value because they require catching the Peeping
Tom spying at the aperture.125 Several states require trespass in addition
to the act of peeping, further limiting the scope of the laws.126
A third category of peeping laws defines the offense not by the
aperture through which the offender looks, but by the secrecy of the
spying.127 Banning surreptitious peeping promises notice to the subject
of when he is being watched; if the subject has no notice, then the
peeping is banned. This approach envisions that the subject of
surveillance may change boundary management mechanisms even
within the sacred space of the home. For example, if a person has notice
that his neighbors regularly and obviously look in his downstairs
124. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-61(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining
“peeping Tom” as one “who peeps through windows or doors, or other like places . . . for the
purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of the persons spied upon and the doing of any other
acts of a similar nature which invade the privacy of such persons”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:284
(2014) (defining a Peeping Tom as “one who peeps through windows or doors, or other like places,
situated on or about the premises of another for the purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy
of persons spied upon without the consent of the persons spied upon”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-130
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (penalizing a person for peeping when he “secretly or
furtively peep[s], sp[ies] or attempt[s] to peep or spy into or through a window, door or other
aperture”).
125. Lance E. Rothenberg, Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and Failure of
the Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space, 49 AM. U.
L. REV. 1127, 1140–43 (2011); Antonietta Vitale, Note, Video Voyeurism and the Right to Privacy:
The Time for Federal Legislation Is Now, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 381, 389–90 (2002)
(“Unfortunately, peeping statutes are few and far between and provide relief only for those few
victims that actually catch Peeping Toms at their windows.”).
126. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1504 (2015) (defining “criminal trespass” as the illegal
entering of a residential structure or yard, and the looking into a residence with “reckless disregard
of infringing on the inhabitant’s right of privacy”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 820 (West, Westlaw
through 2015) (defining “trespassing with intent to peer or peep” as when a person “knowingly
enters upon the occupied property or premises of another utilized as a dwelling, with intent to peer
or peep into the window or door of such property or premises and who . . . otherwise acts in a
manner commonly referred to as ‘Peeping Tom’”; and defining a Peeping Tom as a trespasser who
“knowingly enters upon the occupied property or premises of another . . . with intent to peer or peep
into the window or door of such property or premises”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-3 (2015)
(defining “window peeking” as the entry onto private property to peep “in the door or window of
any inhabited building or structure located thereon”); Rothenberg, supra note 125.
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining
“peeping” as looking secretly into a room occupied by another person); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1171 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (defining a Peeping Tom as a “person who
hides, waits or otherwise loiters in the vicinity of any . . . place of residence . . . with the unlawful
and willful intent to watch, gaze, or look upon any person in a clandestine manner”).
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windows, he may choose to always come downstairs fully dressed. The
notice-based law will not penalize his neighbors.
Voyeurism laws build on Peeping Tom laws. They penalize the
viewing, photographing, or videotaping of another without consent.128
Many state statutes limit the voyeurism offense to a particular sensitive
subject matter: photographs of nudity, or of specific body parts.129 Many
states additionally limit the scope of the offense to surveillance
conducted in physical locations where the subject can show a reasonable
expectation of privacy.130 Some states, as with intrusion or Peeping Tom
laws, require trespass or surreptitious invasion.131 A number of states
require lascivious or sexual intent.132
These voyeurism offenses reinforce several kinds of boundary
management. Like the intrusion tort and Peeping Tom statutes, they
enforce boundary management that involves concealing oneself behind
walls or in private locations or in privately-owned locations. In addition,
they enforce notice and consent for such acts of observation or
photography.
But in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it became apparent that privacy
laws did not cover a new category of voyeurism offenses: the taking of
“up-skirt” photographs or their equivalent in public spaces.133 Many
128. Vitale, supra note 125, at 394–95.
129. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.123(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.)
(“A person commits the crime of indecent viewing or photography if, in the state, the person
knowingly views, or produces a picture of, the private exposure of the genitals, anus, or female
breast of another person and the view or production is without . . . knowledge or consent.”); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 565.253(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Veto Sess.) (“A person commits the crime
of invasion of privacy if . . . [he] knowingly views, photographs or films another person, without
that person’s knowledge and consent, while the person being viewed, photographed or filmed is in a
state of full or partial nudity and is in a place where one would have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”).
130. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7507.1(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015) (A person
commits the offense of invasion of privacy if he knowingly “[v]iews, photographs, videotapes,
electronically depicts, films, or otherwise records another person without that person’s knowledge
and consent while that person is in a state of full or partial nudity and is in a place where the person
would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
131. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08(A)–(D) (West, Westlaw through 2015) (making it illegal
to “commit trespass or otherwise surreptitiously invade the privacy of another” “for the purpose of
sexually arousing or gratifying the person’s self”).
132. See, e.g., id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115(2) (2014) (“A person commits the crime of
voyeurism if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person, he or she
knowingly views, photographs, or films another person, without that person’s knowledge and
consent, while the person being viewed, photographed, or filmed is in a place where he or she
would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
133. See Nancy Danforth Zeronda, Note, Street Shootings: Covert Photography and Public
Privacy, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2010) (observing that “courts cling to conventional thinking
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voyeurism statutes require the subject to be nude, and to be located in a
private location.134 The taking of photographs of a clothed subject in
public spaces is not covered by these definitions.
So instead of focusing on the boundary management mechanism of
walls, several states shifted to enforcing the boundary management
mechanism of clothing. Illinois made it unlawful to videotape a person
under or through clothing for the purpose of viewing the body or
undergarments.135 Ohio did the same a year later, penalizing
surreptitious recording.136 California also clarified that the offense
covered recording under or through clothing, but limited it to
“circumstances in which the other person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”137
Interestingly, these more recent voyeurism statutes show that courts
and legislators can and will recognize some kinds of expectations of
privacy even in a public space.138 The federal Video Voyeurism
Prevention Act of 2004 defines a reasonable expectation of privacy as a
person’s belief that a private area of the body will not be visible to the
public, “regardless of whether that person is in a public or private
place.”139
Clothing usually functions as an effective boundary management
that invasions of privacy cannot occur in the public sphere. New and problematic forms of street
photography necessitate a reexamination of photographic invasions of privacy”).
134. See, e.g., id. at 1144–45 (discussing State v. Glas, 147 Wash. 2d 410, 421–22, 54 P.3d 147,
154 (2002), a case in which the court read Washington’s voyeurism statute not to include intrusions
made in public); see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7507.1(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015)
(penalizing recording “while that person is in a state of full or partial nudity and is in a place where
that person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
135. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-4(a-10) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“It is
unlawful for any person to knowingly make a video record or transmit live video of another person
under or through the clothing worn by that other person for the purpose of viewing the body of or
the undergarments worn by that other person without that person’s consent.”).
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.08(D) (West, Westlaw through 2015) (“No person shall
secretly or surreptitiously videotape, film, photograph, or otherwise record another person under or
through the clothing being worn by that other person for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the
undergarments worn by, that other person.”).
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“Any person who
uses a concealed camcorder . . . to secretly videotape, film, photograph, or record by electronic
means, another, identifiable person under or through the clothing being worn by that other person,
for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the undergarments worn by, that other person, without the
consent or knowledge of that other person, with the intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust,
passions, or sexual desires of that person and invade the privacy of that other person, under
circumstances in which the other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy [will have violated
this statute].”).
138. See Kaminski, supra note 58, at 70.
139. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5)(B) (2012).
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mechanism when an individual is in public. The rise of low-cost,
smaller, and less obtrusive recording devices that can be hidden in new
vantage points means that in practice clothing has become a less
effective boundary management tool. But to preserve the efficacy of
clothing, and prevent individuals from having to resort to changed
behavior, legislators stepped in. Voyeurism laws allow individuals to
continue to rely on clothing as an effective means of preventing
unwanted disclosure. These laws protect individuals (usually women)
from dignitary harms, unwanted harassment, and impingement on selfexpression; but they do so through enabling individuals to continue to
rely on their clothes.
Interestingly, in Japan, technology companies volunteered a different
solution to the voyeurism problem. In response to an uptick in up-skirt
photography in Japan, cellular phone manufacturers agreed to make
cellphone cameras play a shutter sound that could not be disabled by
muting the phone.140 In other words, they chose to provide notice,
presumably to use social norms to restrict illicit photography and
videography. This notice was not required by law, but was volunteered
and coordinated between phone companies.141 However, photographers
bypassed this technological fix by downloading a “silent photo”
smartphone application that removed the shutter sound, making it easier
to take surreptitious pictures.142 The limitations of technological
solutions led to a discussion of legal solutions instead.143
Intrusion upon seclusion laws, Peeping Tom laws, and video
voyeurism laws are inherently limited in scope. Because courts have
largely limited the application of the intrusion tort to private spaces, state
legislators have no guarantees that the tort will cover offenses that occur
in public or those that are assisted by new technologies.144 Peeping Tom
140. Akky Akimoto, Google Glass May Shatter Japan’s ‘Manner’ Mode, JAPAN TIMES (May 15,
2013),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2013/05/15/digital/google-glass-may-shatter-japansmanner-mode/#.VYDdSkbJJ—. (“[A]ll cellphones with built-in cameras shipped with a shutter
sound that played when a photo was taken—and it could not be disabled. This was not something
that was required by law, but it was taken up voluntarily by all Japanese cellphone vendors. These
self-regulations have never been made publicly available, but NTT Docomo told The Japan Times
that they implemented it to ‘prevent secret filming or other privacy issues.’”).
141. Id.
142. Masaki Karaya, Rise in Sleazy Voyeurism Blamed on ‘Silent Photo’ Smartphone App, THE
ASAHI SHIMBUN (Feb. 7, 2013), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/
AJ201302070001.
143. Id.
144. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc.,
955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). But see, in the Fourth Amendment context, Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). Intrusion upon seclusion might include
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laws usually have physical limits built into the statute: that the offender
has committed trespass or was caught at the window. Voyeurism laws
are often limited to physical spaces, particularly sensitive subject matter,
lascivious intent, or peering through clothing. Thus, this first category of
boundary management laws can get overlooked as representing a more
traditional conception of privacy.
The next two types of surveillance laws approach boundary
management differently, reaching the ways in which newer technologies
threaten an individual’s ability to calculate her ideal degree of
disclosure.
2.

Distance, Vantage Point, and “Sense Enhancement”

A second type of law steps in when technology closes distances or
makes it possible to observe someone from new vantage points.
Distances can be closed through “sense enhancement”: the use of a
zoom lens, for example, or a microphone. Technology can also enable an
observer to achieve new vantage points, such as observing an individual
from overhead or underneath.
Both the closing of distances and the enabling of new vantage points
disrupt traditional mechanisms of notice. These kinds of surveillance are
less visible than physical trespass, or listening in on a conversation while
remaining visible to the speaker. An individual may not be aware that he
is being observed or recorded from a distance, through a wall, or from or
a particular angle, and thus will miscalculate his ideal degree of
disclosure.
This second type of law is not entirely distinct from the first type;
many laws addressing sense-enhancing technologies are still concerned
with the breach of a barrier surrounding a particular physical space. And
some laws contain both concerns over the permeability of physical
barriers and concerns over the closing of distance or adoption of unusual
vantage points. But if the first type of law was concerned with the actual
holes in a wall, this second type is concerned with technology that
enhances human senses to create constructive holes in the wall.
Technologies like zoom lenses or thermal imaging allow watchers to
transgress the same boundaries protected in Peeping Tom statutes
video voyeurism, for example, but has largely been ineffectively enforced. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 cmt. c (1977) (“Even in a public place, however, there may be some
matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public
gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”). But
see Rothenberg, supra note 125 (noting that courts hesitate to find a reasonable expectation of
privacy in public); Vitale, supra note 125.
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without necessarily falling within the statutes’ purview because a
watcher does not need to trespass or to look through a window to gain
access to the private space or private information.145 California’s
paparazzi law provides a fascinating example of legal reinforcement of
existing boundary management mechanisms that have become less
effective in the face of new technologies. Until 2014, the California
paparazzi law targeted the use of telephoto lenses or sense-enhancing
audio technology to peer into or listen in on a privately-owned space.146
The statute focused on preserving the integrity of a space that has
traditionally been inaccessible, except by physical trespass, maintaining
traditional boundary management mechanisms in a private space in the
face of technological change. In 2014, the statute was amended to cover
all technology used to peer into an area formerly inaccessible except by
trespass, even if that technology is not sense-enhancing.147 The
amendment was purportedly passed to address the use of drones, which
might take new perspectives (from the sky) without needing to employ
sense-enhancing technologies.148
The intrusion tort has been used to address sense-enhancement
technologies.149 In a case addressing whether a videographer could be
liable for recording a conversation between a car accident victim and a
nurse, the California Supreme Court observed that “merely . . . being
present at a place where he could hear such conversations with unaided
ears” did not constitute a privacy violation.150 But “placing a microphone
on [the nurse’s] person, amplifying and recording what she said and
heard” could violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.151 Using
amplification to listen in on a conversation prevents the subject of
surveillance from adjusting her degree of disclosure appropriately
because it does not provide notice to the subject the way visibly standing

145. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(3)(b) (1962) (“It is an affirmative defense . . . [that] the
premises were at the time open to members of the public and the actor complied with all lawful
conditions imposed upon access to or remaining in the premises.”).
146. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 2011) (regulating recording where a “physical
impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing
device was used”).
147. Assemb. 2306, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1314/bill/asm/ab_2301-2350/ab_2306_bill_20140930_chaptered.pdf; Cade, supra note 3.
148. See Melanie Mason, California Assembly Approves Limits on Drones, Paparazzi, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-assembly-floor-bills20140129-story.html.
149. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods. Inc., 995 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
150. Id. at 491.
151. Id.
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nearby might.
Technology can also enable observation from unexpected vantage
points. The voyeurism laws discussed earlier implicitly contemplate this
problem.152 While the laws do not explicitly target taking photographs or
video from below a person, “up-skirt” photography is a problem
precisely because it captures information from an unexpected vantage
point.153 It is far harder to manage one’s expected degree of disclosure
when the recording device is positioned to capture information from an
unexpected angle.
Drones are discussed at greater length later in this Article, but the
Texas drone statute provides an example of a law addressing both sense
enhancement and vantage point and is thus worth mentioning here.
Texas has made it illegal to use a drone “to capture an image of an
individual or privately owned real property in this state with the intent to
conduct surveillance on the individual.”154 An image does not fall into
the statute’s scope, however, if it was taken from a height of below eight
feet above ground level in a public place, and without using technologies
that enhance the senses “beyond normal human perception.”155 In other
words, the statute encompasses only images taken from above eight feet
high and using zoom or audio-enhancing technology. It targets
observation from an unusually heightened vantage point, coupled with
sense-enhancement. The further away the drone is, and the less
observable it is, and the more able it is to observe a person without being
seen. The more it is able to observe a person without being seen, the
stronger the harm to that person’s ability to accurately boundary
manage. This suggests that if a person can see a drone, they can
boundary manage accordingly and thus their privacy is not violated. But
if the drone is further up, a person might not expect to be observed from
that height, perspective, and zoom, and thus may fail to adequately
boundary manage. By addressing the height of the drone, and its ability
to amplify images, the Texas drone statute seeks to enable accurate
boundary management by individuals. The Texas statute, however, is
also riddled with exceptions for particular industries discussed at greater
length below, making it a poor example of legislating, overall.156

152. See supra Part V.A.1.
153. See Zeronda, supra note 4, at 1132–33 (“As its name suggests, up-skirt photography
involves taking pictures of women up their skirts.”).
154. H.R. 912, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 423.003 (Tex. 2013).
155. Id. § 423.002(15).
156. Id. § 423.002 (listing exceptions).
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Ephemerality

A third type of surveillance law also addresses the impact of
technology on the environment in which disclosures are made, but
instead of addressing the increased permeability of walls, it focuses on
technology’s impact on expectations about human memory. Instead of
addressing the visibility of the recording device, this type of law focuses
on the way in which recording technology eliminates the ephemerality of
the natural environment. A world without recording devices is more
ephemeral in nature; people forget interactions, or fail to aggregate them
and make connections or inferences.
Eavesdropping laws address recording technologies that change the
environment in which boundary management decisions get made.157
Some eavesdropping statutes, like the paparazzi statute, focus on the
management of private physical spaces. But others preserve a different
157. Rothenberg, supra note 125, at 1142 n.67; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13A-11-31(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (describing “[c]riminal eavesdropping” as when a
person intentionally uses a device to eavesdrop); CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as when a person “intentionally and
without . . . consent . . . eavesdrops upon or records the confidential communication”); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-9-304(1)(a)–(c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (defining
“[e]avesdropping” as when a person not present for a conversation “[k]nowingly overhears or
records such conversation or discussion without the consent . . . [or] for the purpose of committing,
aiding, or abetting the commission of an unlawful act; or knowingly . . . attempts to use or
disclose . . . the contents of any such conversation or discussion”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(1)
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as any attempt “in a
clandestine manner intentionally to overhear, transmit, or record . . . the private conversation of
another which shall originate in any private place”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining “eavesdropping” as the intentional entry into a private place for
the purpose of surreptitiously listening to private communications or observing private conduct);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.010 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (describing “eavesdrop”
as the intentional use of any device to “overhear, record, amplify or transmit any part of a wire or
oral communication of others without the consent of at least one (1) party thereto”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 28.807(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (defining “eavesdropping” as the
intentional trespass onto another’s property or use of any device to “overhear, record, amplify or
transmit any part of the private discourse of others without the permission of all persons engaged in
the discourse”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2015) (describing “eavesdropping” as the
unlawful “wiretapping, mechanical overhearing of a conversation, or interception or accessing an
electronic communication”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-02 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess.) (defining “felony eavesdropping” as the intentional interception of any communication
“by use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device,” and “misdemeanor eavesdropping” as the
secret lingering about a private place with “intent to overhear discourse or conversation therein”);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1202 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (describing
eavesdropping as “secretly loitering about any building, with intent to overhear discourse therein,
and to repeat or publish the same to vex, annoy, or injure others”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-1
(2015) (defining “eavesdropping” as a trespass with intent to eavesdrop in a private place, or an
installation of any device for “observing, photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting
sounds or events in such place”).
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kind of assumption about one’s environment: the assumption that one’s
conversations, even outside of privately owned space, will not have
staying power. Eavesdropping statutes address boundary management
that is conducted based on experiences with ephemerality and human
memory. If every conversation outside of the home may be recorded,
then people may want to adjust the content, tone, and length of their
conversations outside of the home to optimize social accessibility and
disclosure.158
But eavesdropping statutes show that determining the level of
appropriate state involvement in boundary management outside of the
home is not simple. Many states require a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the conversation.159 This requirement ensures that
conversations are protected only when the subject is in fact showing that
she has a reasonable expectation of privacy by trying to employ other
tools of boundary management. If you shout the conversation from a
rooftop, chances are many will hear you and some may record you. In
some states, if the recording device is in plain view, then the subject will
be deemed to have consented to being recorded, even with no explicit
consent.160
This makes sense in the framework of boundary management,
because when the recording device is in plain view, the subject is given
opportunity to adapt optimization behaviors accordingly. In public
spaces, the state is not necessarily interested in preventing people from
adapting their behavior to account for the presence of others. But it is
interested in enabling people who believe they can rely on older forms of
boundary management—talking in a lower voice, in a perceivably
private space, without visible listeners—to have a fair chance to
boundary manage appropriately, relying on those mechanisms.
Most states provide that conversations can be legally recorded with
the consent of only one party.161 This ensures that eavesdropping statutes
do not impose additional boundary management mechanisms where
there weren’t mechanisms before. Before recording or eavesdropping
technologies, a speaker in a conversation depended on the relationship
with the other person to decide how much to reveal. False friends existed

158. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 613–
14 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
159. See Potere, supra note 4, at 283–84; Triano, supra note 4.
160. Potere, supra note 4, at 283.
161. Id. at 283 n.74.
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long before cellphone recordings.162 Thus many eavesdropping laws do
not step in to ensure that friends will be more loyal. Those
eavesdropping laws that require two-party consent and fail to require a
reasonable expectation of privacy have been found most troubling by
courts from a First Amendment perspective.163
Location-tracking also raises issues of ephemerality and permanence.
Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) location-track individuals over
time by photographing and analyzing license plates appearing on public
roads. The Wall Street Journal revealed in 2014 that the government has
been using ALPRs to track millions of individuals in real time.164 Law
enforcement’s use of ALPRs raises questions similar to those raised by
GPS, which the Supreme Court recently addressed in United States v.
Jones.165 But governing the private use of ALPRs moves into the
relatively uncharted territory of balancing one entity’s right to record
against another’s right to privacy.
Laws governing ALPR systems can be understood as governing
boundary management. Location-tracking implicates boundary
management over time and distance. Prior to technologies such as
ALPRs and GPS, tracking a person over a long period of time was costly
and involved both focus and effort.166 A person could thus rely on
practical obstacles to prevent location-tracking over time.167 When
legislators decide to step in to govern GPS use or ALPR use, they do so
to impose legal friction where before practical friction prevented
tracking.
At least two states have enacted laws governing the private use of
ALPRs.168 Utah initially enacted a law prohibiting a person from using
an ALPR system.169 The Utah statute defined an ALPR system as “a
system of one or more mobile or fixed automated high-speed cameras
used in combination with computer algorithms to convert an image of a
162. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963).
163. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (analyzing Illinois’s two-party-consent wiretap law under
the First Amendment).
164. Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-1422314779.
165. United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
166. See, e.g., id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).
167. See generally Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of
Surveillance: Making Cents out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335 (2014).
168. S. 0196, 2013 Gen. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2013); S. 2141, 188th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess.
(Mass. 2014).
169. Utah S. 0196.
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license plate into computer-readable data.”170
However, shortly after enactment of this law, Utah was sued by
ALPR companies for violating their First Amendment rights.171 In
reaction, Utah heavily amended the law to allow private entities to
collect license plate information, sell it to third parties, and hold it for up
to nine months.172
Arkansas also enacted a license plate reader law.173 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, given the effectiveness of such an action in Utah,
Arkansas has also been sued for First Amendment violations.174 The
Massachusetts legislature has proposed an ALPR law, but as of January
2015, the law has been sitting with the Senate.175
B.

Determining the Strength of the Legislative Interest

Framing surveillance laws as protecting boundary management
allows for at least two types of government interests, as discussed: an
interest in notifying people in order to enable boundary management,
and an interest in preventing a shift to other kinds of less desirable
behaviors. The government interest in notifying people that they are
being recorded is strong, and nicely tailored to enabling boundary
management. It may raise interesting questions related to anonymous
speech—does one have a right to record surreptitiously, where
announcing that one is recording would prevent the recording from
occurring?176 But the idea that states may require notice of recording
should be understandable to courts as an interest in enabling boundary
management in a shifting environment.
Other surveillance laws instead aim to preserve a genre of boundary
management and prevent a shift in behavior. Understanding statutes this
way can allow courts to focus on the strength of the government interest
in preventing a particular shift, or set of shifts, in behavior, instead of

170. Id.
171. Complaint, Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Herbert, No. 2:14-cv-00099 (D. Utah Feb.
13, 2014).
172. S.
222,
2014
Gen.
Sess.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Utah
2014),
available at
http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills/static/SB0222.html.
173. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-1801–1808 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
174. Complaint, Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Beebe, No. 4:14-cv-00327 (E.D. Ark. May
30, 2014); License Plate Reader Makers Sue Arkansas for Banning Their Tech, RT QUESTION MORE
(June 18, 2014, 11:27 PM), http://rt.com/usa/166916-vigilant-drn-arkansas-alpr-lawsuit/.
175. See S. 2141, 188th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2014).
176. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (finding First Amendment
protection for distribution of anonymous petitions).
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identifying an amorphous notion of privacy. This may raise interesting
tailoring issues, questioning how narrowly states will have to tailor
statutes to prevent particular shifts, versus preserving a traditionally
protectable genre of behavior, such as boundary management in the
home.
C.

Identifying the First Amendment Interest in Privacy Protection

Privacy laws can run into First Amendment problems, but they can
also be essential to First Amendment interests.177 The boundary
management framework demonstrates how this works in practice. As
previously described, boundary management studies suggest that people
increase disclosure when they trust that information will not move
beyond an expected boundary from trusted parties to untrustworthy
people.178 When a trusted boundary instead becomes permeable, people
may decrease disclosure. This decrease in disclosure can often be
articulated as a decrease in speech. In other words, if law does not step
in to reinforce the formerly trusted boundary, people will speak less, or
less frankly, resorting to lying or omission as boundary management
tactics.
Courts are already receptive to this idea of the relationship between
privacy and free speech. In Bartnicki v. Vopper,179 a case about whether
a radio station could distribute an illegally wiretapped conversation, the
Supreme Court recognized that there were speech interests on both sides
of the case.180 The majority recognized that if people are unable to trust
that an intimate conversation is in fact intimate, they may speak less.181
In the earlier Fourth Amendment case of United States v. White,182
both Justice Harlan and Justice Douglas noted in dissents that allowing
electronic eavesdropping by an undercover agent could have significant
First Amendment implications. Justice Harlan explained that off-hand
conversations are usually made to a limited audience, and are easily
forgotten. People rely on these features of their environment to manage
how open they are in conversation.183 In the absence of legal protection
177. See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); Kaminski
& Witnov, supra note 59.
178. DERLEGA & CHAIKIN, supra note 97, at 104.
179. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
180. Id. at 533.
181. Id. (“[T]he fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling
effect on private speech.”).
182. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
183. Id. at 788 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Much off-hand exchange is easily forgotten and one may
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from permanent recordings, people will regulate the content of their
conversations and disclose less.184 Justice Douglas more directly
identified this as a First Amendment problem. He focused on loss of
spontaneity: “Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and
spontaneous utterances.”185
Judge Posner, dissenting in a recent Seventh Circuit case on the First
Amendment right to record, similarly noted that eavesdropping laws
protect First Amendment values.186 Judge Posner noted that people
would be less likely to disclose useful information to the police if there
is no law protecting public conversations with police officers from being
recorded.187 Judge Posner has been a vocal critic of privacy.188 But he
seemed very receptive to the idea that electronic eavesdropping laws
prevent people from resorting to socially undesirable boundary
management techniques. Posner explained that electronic recording can
eliminate communicative spontaneity, quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in
White: “[W]ords would be measured a good deal more carefully and
communication inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being
transmitted and transcribed.”189 And interestingly, Posner understood the
eavesdropping law as stepping in to preserve a genre of
communication—off-hand communication in public in the absence of
recording devices. He cited Justice Harlan for the proposition that poor
human memory, a limited audience, and the relative anonymity most
people enjoy in public spaces usually preserve the obscurity of off-hand
conversations.190 Electronic recording disrupts that natural obscurity and
count on the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the very fact of a limited audience, and the
likelihood that the listener will either overlook or forget what is said, as well as the listener’s
inability to reformulate a conversation without having to contend with a documented record.”).
184. Id. at 787 (“[W]ords would be measured a good deal more carefully and communication
inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being transmitted and transcribed.”).
185. Id. at 762.
186. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 611 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.,
dissenting)
187. Id. (noting that finding the Illinois eavesdropping statute to violate the First Amendment “is
likely to impair the ability of police both to extract information relevant to police duties and to
communicate effectively with persons whom they speak with in the line of duty”).
188. Ronald K.L. Collins, On Privacy, Free Speech, & Related Matters—Richard Posner vs
David Cole & Others, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://concurringopinions.com/
archives/2014/12/on-privacy-free-speech-related-matters-richard-posner-vs-david-cole-others.html.
189. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 612.
190. Id. (quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in White, 401 U.S. at 787–88); see also id. at 613–14
(“[P]rivate talk in public places is common, indeed ubiquitous, because most people spend a lot of
their time in public places; because they rely on their anonymity and on the limited memory of
others to minimize the risk of publication; because public places are (paradoxically) often more
private than private places (imagine if detectives could meet with their informants only in police
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causes people to speak and behave in more conservative ways.191 Posner
thus identified that the state’s eavesdropping statute in fact promotes a
First Amendment interest in conversational privacy, even in public
spaces.192 While the majority did recognize a First Amendment interest
in conversational privacy, it explained that the statute was drafted too
broadly to survive First Amendment scrutiny.193
Courts evaluating privacy torts have similarly noted that failure to
legally reinforce the expected boundaries of conversations could lead to
more inhibited conversations, with negative social consequences. In
Dietemann v. Time,194—a Ninth Circuit case about whether the First
Amendment protected reporters who recorded their interactions with a
quack doctor—the court found that surreptitious electronic recording
violated the plaintiff’s privacy despite the fact that reporters had
permission to be on the premises.195 The court explained that a “different
rule . . . would surely lead to guarded conversations and conduct where
candor is most valued, e.g., in the case of doctors and lawyers.”196 A
doctor who could be surreptitiously recorded might not be honest with
her patient; she might boundary manage through discretion or even
dishonesty, out of fear that the expected boundary external to her patient
relationship might be breached through recording. The court’s reasoning
in this is somewhat backwards, since usually it’s the patient’s privacy
and need for candor that provokes concern. Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit appeared to recognize that legal protection of boundary
management can encourage freer speech within a protected

stations); and because eavesdropping on strangers is actually rather uncommon because it is so
difficult in most cases to understand a conversation between strangers.”).
191. Id. at 613 (citing Lizette Alvarez, Spring Break Gets Tamer as World Watches Online, N.Y.
TIMES, March 16, 2012, at A10).
192. Id. (“There is more on the state’s side of this case than privacy of communications and the
effectiveness of law enforcement—and the more is the same First Amendment interest that the
ACLU says it wants to promote. The majority opinion concedes that ‘conversational privacy’
‘serves First Amendment interests,’ but thinks there can be no conversational privacy when the
conversation takes place in a public place . . . .”); see also id. at 614 (“[O]n the other side of the
balance are the inhibiting effect of nonconsensual recording of conversations on the number and
candor of conversations (and hence on values that the First Amendment protects) . . . .”).
193. Id. at 608 (“[W]e have acknowledged the importance of conversational privacy and heeded
the basic distinction drawn in Katz that some conversations in public places implicate privacy and
others do not . . . . But the Illinois eavesdropping statute obliterates the distinction between private
and nonprivate by criminalizing all nonconsensual audio recording regardless of whether the
communication is private in any sense.” (emphasis in original)).
194. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
195. Id. at 249.
196. Id.
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conversation. This internalization of First Amendment rights within a
privacy law could help such laws better withstand First Amendment
scrutiny.
D.

Guiding the Enactment of New Laws

Understanding the state’s interest in surveillance laws as an interest in
boundary management should enable legislators to enact new,
legitimate, and appropriately tailored laws. If a legislature decides that
its interest is in enabling people to effectively boundary manage in a
particular context, then it can devise a statute that focuses on requiring
notice to the individual. If instead a legislature worries about the
pernicious effects of behavioral shifts—such as wearing protective
clothing (up-skirt laws) or having less truthful and open conversations
(eavesdropping laws)—then it can enact laws that reinforce particular
genres of boundary management.
The particular state interest is important because emerging
technologies will inspire more boundary management laws. Some of the
issues will be familiar: for example, the governance of location tracking
over time, or the governance of intrusion into intimate spaces. Other
issues will be newer: for example, the use of robotic faces to manipulate
trust.
This section reviews the recent enactment of drone privacy laws as an
example of how drafting laws around the boundary management interest
can make for better laws. Then it discusses the appropriateness of the
boundary management framework for devising new privacy laws to
govern robotics.
1.

Drone Laws as an Example

Recent technological developments have inspired states to enact new
laws governing information gathering by drones, or unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). Ryan Calo famously referred to drones as “privacy
catalysts,” predicting that drones would force a public conversation
about many of the privacy violations scholars have been discussing for
decades.197 And, in fact, multiple states have enacted drone privacy laws,
both to govern law enforcement use of drones (which is outside of the
scope of this Article), and to govern private drone use.198
197. Calo, supra note 22, at 32.
198. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. & Sp. A Sess.);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
167 / 1–40 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
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This state-by-state approach allows experimentation with privacy
legislation, and will allow courts to determine how best to balance
statutes protecting privacy against the burgeoning First Amendment
right to record.199 Interestingly, many of these state laws governing
private drone use have been enacted before the FAA officially permitted
commercial use of drones.200 States have been anticipating drone-related
privacy problems rather than waiting for the technology to be widely
commercially used.
State drone statutes vary considerably. Some clearly articulate a
boundary management interest, while others more clearly reflect
haphazard lobbying. The closer a state hews to enabling boundary
management, the better the Legislature is able to justify the law’s
existence, and the more legitimate the law appears. Drone privacy laws
thus illustrate how boundary management principles might guide the
enactment of new privacy laws, and help legislators avoid the pitfalls of
more haphazard legislation.
The Texas Legislature passed one of the more clearly haphazard
drone statutes. At its core, however, the statute can be understood as
addressing boundary management. Texas was one of the first states to
enact a statute governing private drone use.201 Texas puts a protective
privacy halo around both private property and persons.202 It prohibits the
use of drones to capture images of individuals or real property with the
“intent to conduct surveillance.”203
The Texas Legislature did not stick to protecting boundary
management. A remarkable number of the many exceptions to the law
are clearly legislative carve-outs for specific industries, including oil and
real estate, and interestingly do not include newsgathering or
journalism.204 The haphazard nature of these exceptions could be

199. Kaminski, supra note 58 (encouraging experimentation).
200. The FAA has authorized some commercial companies to use drones through the Section 333
process, but otherwise commercial drone use as of this draft is federally banned. Hobbyists may use
drones within line of sight and under 400 feet. See Civil Operations (Non-Governmental), FED.
AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/civil_operations/ (last modified Mar. 17, 2015, 10:42
AM); Model Aircraft Operations, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/model_aircraft/
(last modified Mar. 4, 2015, 1:17 PM).
201. See H.R. 912, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
202. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.003 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
203. Id. The statute says “intent” has the meaning assigned to it by Section 6.03 of the Penal
Code. That section defines intent versus negligence versus knowingly, but doesn’t define
“surveillance.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
204. For example, there are carve-outs for real estate and oil pipeline inspections. TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 423.002(13), (18).
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deemed content-based or viewpoint-based regulation under First
Amendment analysis,205 and problematically reflects unequal treatment
due to lobbying.
The Idaho drone law is broad, and aimed at privacy violations rather
than solely at trespass.206 It prohibits the intentional surveillance by
drone of “specifically targeted persons or specifically targeted private
property.”207 The term “surveillance” is not defined in the statute, but
may be read by courts to indicate a temporal requirement, which would
implicate boundary management over time.
The Idaho law again nods at the coextensiveness of physical and
social boundaries, banning surveillance of an individual or a dwelling
and its curtilage. A second cause of action bans the use of a drone “to
photograph or otherwise record an individual . . . for the purpose of
publishing or otherwise publicly disseminating such photograph or
recording.”208 Rather than addressing boundary management over time,
this addresses boundary management in the number of people one
intends information to flow to. Interestingly, the Idaho drone law
exempts drones used for mapping and resource management,209
suggesting that incidental recording may not breach privacy interests.
However, the Idaho law, like the Texas law, reflects obvious
lobbying. The Legislature singled out farms, ranches, and dairies for
protection.210 The singling out of particular groups for protection, just
like the singling out of particular groups as exempt from the Texas
statute’s coverage, could pose content-based regulation problems under
the First Amendment.
Tennessee enacted two drone laws in 2014. The first is a hunting law,
making it a misdemeanor for a person to use a drone “to conduct video
surveillance of private citizens who are lawfully hunting or fishing.”211
Illinois has enacted a similar law, protecting hunters.212
The second Tennessee drone law mirrors Texas’s law.213 The
205. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011).
206. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. & 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).
207. Id. § 21-213(2)(a).
208. Id. § 21-213(2)(b).
209. Id. § 21-213(1)(b)(ii).
210. Id. § 21-213(2)(a)(ii). The Idaho statute also exempts model planes “used purely for sport or
recreational purposes.” Id. § 21-213(1)(b)(i).
211. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-302 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.).
212. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5 / 48-3(b)(10) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
213. S. 1892, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 29,
39-13).
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Tennessee drone law makes it a class C misdemeanor to use a drone to
“capture an image” of an individual or real property with the intent to
conduct surveillance.214 The law also bans knowing use of the image;
possessing the image; and disclosing, displaying, distributing, or
otherwise using the image after capturing it.215 The law could be
understood as concerned with contextual integrity, as destruction of the
image before distribution is a defense.216 Like the Texas law, the
Tennessee drone statute is riddled with exceptions, excepting oil pipeline
use, well safety, and research use.217 The Oregon drone law takes a
different approach; it hews closely to real property rights.218 Rather than
addressing surveillance per se, it addresses “trespass by a drone.”219 The
Oregon drone law creates a private right of action for anybody who
“owns or lawfully occupies real property” against a person conducting
drone flight over that property.220 Initially, drone trespass was limited to
400 feet above the property, but Oregon has since amended the statute to
cover any overhead flight.221 If one understands this trespass action as
enforcing a privacy right, then this approach is similar to the California
anti-paparazzi law, in that it considers low-flying drones to unacceptably
disrupt boundary management taking place within and around the home.
The Oregon law thus preserves whatever genre of boundary
management a person uses on her own property, or property she lawfully
occupies. Oregon legislators may have adopted the property-based
approach to avoid potential First Amendment problems raised by the
right to record, or may truly have considered the trespass-like aspect of
drone flight more problematic. However, the law fails to address privacy
violations that occur from drones operated away from an individual’s
property, with sense-enhancing technologies.
The Oregon statute includes additional requirements. The drone must
have been flown over the property on at least one additional occasion,
and the property owner or occupier must have notified the drone
operator that she did not wish the drone to be flown again in that

214. Id. § 4(a).
215. Id. § 5(a)(2)(B) (Class B misdemeanor).
216. Id. § 4(c).
217. Id. § 3.
218. H.R. 2710, § 15, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013) (codified as amended by H.R. 2354, 78th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015), at OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380 (2014)).
219. Id. at § 15(3).
220. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.380(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
221. H.R. 2354, § 11, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380).
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manner.222 Oregon thus requires the potential plaintiff to actively engage
in social boundary management, by contacting the drone operator,
before a legal action can be brought. The law is brought in to enforce
boundary management only after notice is provided to the drone
operator.
The Wisconsin drone statute makes it a misdemeanor to use a drone
to “photograph, record, or otherwise observe another individual in a
place or location where the individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”223 The statute does not define whether that place is in private
or in public. Like the tort of intrusion, this leaves many decisions in the
hands of courts. But by targeting drones as the recording tool, the
Wisconsin legislature might be nudging courts towards addressing the
boundary management problems raised by drones: surreptitious
recording, by a non-party to an interaction, from vantage points not
formerly achievable by most people, or at least not without great cost.
2.

Robots and the Not-So-Distant Future

If drones are the privacy problem of today, robots are the problem of
the not-so-distant tomorrow. Robots in the home raise a slew of
fascinating boundary management problems.224 Robots are technologies
that sense, process, and act in physical space.225 People often rely on
walls and social boundaries to ensure that the home is particularly
private. If people permit robots into the home, even for limited tasks,
then external walls no longer protect them from the broadcasting of a
large amount of intimate information to third parties. Legislatures and
courts will have to decide the extent to which permitting household
robots into intimate spaces where relatively uninhibited behavior occurs
extinguishes a privacy interest. This is no longer a question of whether
information gathered in public can be considered private, but whether
information gathered in private spaces by entities that have permission to
be there can be considered private.226 In other words, it is a question of
222. Id. at § 15(1)(a)–(b).
223. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.10 (West, Westlaw through 2015).
224. Ryan Calo, Robots and Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2010) (not identifying problem as boundary
management, but identifying a number of the privacy issues raised by robots: direct surveillance,
increased access, and social meaning); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What
Will We Have Agreed To?, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 661 (forthcoming 2015).
225. See Calo, supra note 24.
226. For a longer discussion of these issues of consent versus genre protection, see Kaminski,
supra note 224.
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whether courts and legislators will decide to protect the genre of
boundary management that takes place in the home—or bear the social
costs that come from shifts in behavior in traditional locations of privacy
protection.
Moreover, robots are not static: They will be able to move within
homes, and transgress boundaries that prevent a static camera from
peering around a corner. Governments will need to assess whether
mobility poses a different threat to boundary management than static but
continuous recording.
Additionally, as both Kate Darling and Ryan Calo have pointed out,
to great effect, robots have a social dimension.227 Humans innately react
to faces, and a considerable amount of research is going in to how
robotic faces, voices, and movements drive human reactions.228 A wellknown older study showed that humans read intent and emotion into
mere motion patterns.229 And humans can feel objects to be worthy of
compassion, based on the object’s design. When a robotics company
released a video of its robot dog being kicked repeatedly, viewers voiced
moral concerns with the perceived abuse.230 The New York Times ran a
heartbreaking video about the demise of Aibo robot dogs, showing
owners holding funerals and mourning their lost pets.231 Soldiers have
expressed feelings of anger and loss at the “death” of bomb-defusing
robots.232 The ability to manipulate human reactions can also have
troubling reverberations with the enforcement of long-held stereotypes.
A study showed that people trust artificial speakers with deeper, more
male-like voices as more authoritative, but would rather reveal intimate

227. Calo, supra note 24, at 119 (on file with author). See generally Darling, supra note 24
(arguing that because people tend to anthropomorphize robots, we should consider granting some
kinds of legal protections to robots).
228. See Calo, supra note 24.
229. See Yann Leroux, An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior. Fritz Heider & Marianne
Simmel. 1944, YOUTUBE (Dec. 26, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9TWwG4SFWQ.
230. Victoria Woollaston, Is It Cruel to Kick a Robotic Dog? Google Video Reignites Debate
over Whether Machines Should Be Treated Like Living Animals, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Feb. 16,
2015, 7:56 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2955544/Would-kick-robotic-dogGoogle-video-regnites-debate-machines-treated-like-living-animals.html.
231. Jonathan Soble, A Robotic Dog’s Mortality, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/technology/robotica-sony-aibo-robotic-dog-mortality.html.
232. Doree Armstrong, Emotional Attachment to Robots Could Affect Outcome on Battlefield,
UW TODAY (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washington.edu/news/2013/09/17/emotional-attachmentto-robots-could-affect-outcome-on-battlefield/; Meghan Neal, Are Soldiers Getting Too Emotionally
Attached to War Robots?, MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 18, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/
blog/are-soldiers-getting-too-emotionally-attached-to-war-robots.
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information to a higher, more female-like voice.233
These stories and studies suggest that human-robot interaction will
operate at a higher level of social attachment and engagement than our
interactions with, say, closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras.
Companies can and will use robot faces, voices, and movements to gain
human trust. One form of boundary management is to evaluate how
much one can rely on the person to whom one is talking. If robots can
manipulate our assessment of the strength of our relationships with
them, then legislators or courts may wish to step in to strengthen those
boundaries through law.234
The Internet of Things, or adding sensors and connectivity to regular
household objects, raises a perhaps more immediate version of a similar
problem. If people are surrounded at home by objects that read to them
as physical objects rather than cameras—such as the smart refrigerator—
then they may continue to boundary manage as though their home
objects were not recording. While robots may manipulate human
emotions to gain trust, smart objects may manipulate human reactions by
remaining calculatedly invisible. Legislators may wish to step in to
either require some form of repeated notice, to enable appropriate
boundary management in formerly private spaces, or may again wish to
preserve certain genres of boundary management to prevent undesirable
behavioral shifts by banning recording.
Smart objects also raise the interesting question of whether othersense-employing recorders raise a new kind of notice issue. People adapt
their behavior when they believe they are being watched—and a pair of
eyes can cue that watching is occurring.235 But are people able to adapt
their behavior appropriately if the observation takes place on a different
sensory dimension—such as, for example, heat-sensing? We may end up
finding that notice works to enable effective boundary management with
respect to certain kinds of information-gathering, but not with respect to
other, non-visual or non-auditory forms. We may find that we are not
able to boundary manage well when the breach takes place using other
senses.

233. AARON POWERS ET AL., ELICITING INFORMATION FROM PEOPLE WITH A GENDERED
HUMANOID ROBOT (2013), available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~kiesler/publications/2005pdfs/
eliciting-information-people-gendered-humanoid-robot.pdf.
234. Woodrow Hartzog has suggested that the FTC is positioned to regulate such “unfair”
behavior by robots under its Section 5 authority. See Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive
Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 793–94 (2015).
235. Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-World
Setting, in 2 BIOLOGY LETTERS 412, 412 (2006).

05 - Kaminski.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

REGULATING REAL-WORLD SURVEILLANCE

10/23/2015 12:47 PM

1165

This Article proposes that we should understand the government
interest in preventing others from looking through walls and from having
a perfect memory as the same underlying interest in enabling or
preserving boundary management. Courts can be sympathetic to this
interest. As new technologies raise new boundary management
challenges, legislators should be more aware of the interests they wish to
protect.
CONCLUSION
Understanding privacy as boundary management certainly is not
limited to the private surveillance context. The boundary management
conception of privacy could, and at least occasionally does, work in the
Fourth Amendment context as well.236
But when it comes to laws governing surveillance by private actors, a
boundary management framework fits particularly well. It helps explain
both what is happening in these laws, and how they might be improved
to better serve a legitimate legislative interest. Boundary management as
a framework benefits from being descriptively accurate, and provides
theoretical guidance to prevent piecemeal laws and guide the scope of
new laws. In addition, the framework sets up privacy laws to be
weighed, as they inevitably will be, against other values such as freedom
of speech.
Reconciling the burgeoning right to record with the government’s
ability to govern intrusive information gathering is necessary as we
move from a world of photographs and cellphone recordings to one
where individuals are increasingly watched and quantified by drones, the
Internet of Things, and even household robots. Real-world information
capture will only become more prevalent; the physical spaces where we
retreat from the online world will become less and less private, and the
physical tactics we use to shield ourselves will become less and less
effective. The problems of information privacy are increasingly
appearing in the physical world, returning us to Warren and Brandeis’s
original fear that we will be recorded when we wish to be let alone.

236. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial
quantum of intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered
discretion, chooses to track—may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way
that is inimical to democratic society.’” (citation omitted)).

